Genre and place in the book. The tenth entry in the catalogue of debts — to PERSONAlexander the Grammarian of Cotiaeum. After the three principal Stoic mentors (Junius Rusticus, Apollonius, Sextus) a short series of specialised teachers begins: Alexander the grammarian (Greek language, 01-10), Fronto (Latin rhetoric, 01-11), Alexander the Platonist (grammar and Platonism, 01-12), Catulus (Stoicism, 01-13), Severus (Stoicism + politics, 01-14), Maximus (Stoicism, 01-15).

01-10 is the first portrait of a teacher of a non-philosophical discipline (grammar). But Marcus ascribes to Alexander not a linguistic skill (which he obviously did transmit, but is not mentioned here) but an ethical quality — tact in correction. This is the characteristic compositional gesture of Book I: even from a grammarian Marcus takes not the matter of the discipline, but the manner of dealing with a human being within that discipline. Alexander is Marcus's teacher not so much of Hellenistic literature as of pedagogical ethics.

Who is Alexander. Ἀλέξανδρος ὁ γραμματικός — usually identified with Alexander of Cotiaeum (Cotiaeum in central Phrygia, modern Kütahya, Turkey). The principal Greek grammarian and commentator on Homer of his generation. He taught at Athens, was summoned to Rome to teach Marcus Greek language and literature; before that, also at Athens, he had taught Aelius Aristides (the principal representative of the Second Sophistic). On Alexander's death, Aelius Aristides delivered a funeral oration in his honour — the surviving "Ἐπιτάφιος εἰς Ἀλέξανδρον" (numbered Or. 32 in Behr; the Dindorf numbering differs). This is the principal external source on Alexander. More in the PERSONcard.

The structure of the passage. The Greek is one long sentence describing one ethical maxim with an elaborated methodology. The structure:

This is an exhaustive pedagogical programme of correction — Marcus unfolds it in a single sentence with all three modes and the proviso for the alternative. Nowhere else in Book I is a pedagogical method described in such detail. It seems that Alexander is for Marcus the paradigm of pedagogical tact, and Marcus considers it important enough to write out the whole methodology.

Analysis.

(1) τὸ ἀνεπίπληκτον. "The not-rebuking [quality]" — ἀ- (privative) + ἐπιπλήττω ("to strike upon, to upbraid, to reproach"). This is the quality of the teacher who, faced with a pupil's mistake, does not fall upon him. The metaphor of the verb ἐπιπλήττω is physical (a striking from above), and it matters: "not-striking" here is not about non-intervention, but about the choice of a non-aggressive mode of correction (see further at item 4).

(2) τὸ μὴ ὀνειδιστικῶς ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι. "Not to take hold [of an error] ὀνειδιστικῶς (reproachfully, with insult)." Ὀνειδιστικῶς is an adverb from ὄνειδος ("disgrace, reproach, shame"), that is, with humiliation. The verb ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι is "to seize upon, to catch," often with the shade of cavilling: "to catch someone in an error" — the standard rhetorical strategy of the Second Sophistic, where philosophers-sophists publicly caught each other in linguistic slips for the purposes of disavowal. Alexander did not use such a strategy, and Marcus takes from him this anti-sophistic ethos, consistent with what Rusticus laid down against σοφιστικὸς ζῆλος.

(3) The three kinds of error: βάρβαρον / σόλοικον / ἀπηχές. The grammatical triad of the Hellenistic school:

• Βάρβαρον — a "barbarism," that is, an incorrect word (a borrowing, a distorted form, an erroneous ending). Etymology: what the βάρβαροι, the non-Greeks, say.
• Σόλοικον — a "solecism," an error in syntax (a wrong construction, a wrong case-government, etc.). Etymology: from Σόλοι (Soli) in Cilicia, the town in which, according to legend, the Greek colonists spoke a corrupted dialect.
• Ἀπηχές — an "ill-sounding," an error in style or sound (a stylistically unfit, a non-euphonic, a coarse word). From ἀ- + ἠχή ("sound").

This is complete coverage of lexical-morphology (βάρβαρον), syntax (σόλοικον), and stylistics (ἀπηχές). The standard grammatical school of the second century was organised around this triad, and Alexander the grammarian was the specialist of such distinctions. Marcus received from him the capacity to see these errors — but also the capacity not to expose them.

(4) ἀλλ' ἐπιδεξίως ... ὃ ἔδει εἰρῆσθαι προφέρεσθαι. "But ἐπιδεξίως (tactfully, dexterously) to utter (προφέρεσθαι) only that very thing which ought to have been said." Ἐπιδέξιος is literally "to the right," that is, "successful, fortunate, dexterous" (the right side is the favourable one); in Hellenistic ethics — "tactful, skilled in social situations." The method: not to point out the error, but to utter the correct form so that the speaker hears, without losing face.

(5) The three modes of insertion: ἀπόκρισις / συνεπιμαρτύρησις / συνδιάληψις. The Alexander-Marcus tactic is realised through three specific rhetorical manoeuvres:

• Ἀπόκρισις — the answer to what has been said. If X has been said incorrectly, to answer using the correct X in one's reply ("yes, and Y, as you say, is...").
• Συνεπιμαρτύρησις — literally "co-attestation," that is, to support and confirm the statement, but in the correct form. This is particularly tactful: instead of "you did not say it rightly," one says "exactly so, and [the correct form]."
• Συνδιάληψις — literally "co-grasping," that is, joint consideration of the same matter, in the course of which the correct expression naturally appears in the speech of the corrector.

This is a gradation of delicacy: from the direct answer (least delicate, but not reproachful) to the joint consideration (most delicate, where the correction itself becomes invisible to the one corrected).

(6) περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, οὐχὶ περὶ τοῦ ῥήματος. "About the πρᾶγμα (the matter) itself, not about the ῥῆμα (the word, the expression)." This is a technically important proviso: at the moment of correction one is to shift the focus from the form (which was erroneous) to the content (which is shared). If the conversation is about φιλία (friendship), and the interlocutor pronounced φιλία in an erroneous form, Marcus speaks about friendship, using the word correctly, and not about the word "φιλία." This shift of focus:

• Preserves the face of the interlocutor (the form is not marked as erroneous).
• Moves the conversation forward (the πρᾶγμα remains the subject).
• Implicitly allows the interlocutor to hear and correct himself.

A parallel to the deep Stoic programme of Marcus: in 01-04, 01-07, and in Med. 4.32, 7.55, and passim — Marcus systematically calls himself to distinguish the essential from the superficial. Grammar here is a particular case of this general distinction: ῥῆμα (the superficial) vs πρᾶγμα (the substantial).

(7) ἢ δι' ἑτέρας τινὸς τοιαύτης ἐμμελοῦς παρυπομνήσεως. "Or by some other such ἐμμελής (harmonious, in-tune) παρυπομνήσις (by-side reminder)." Ἐμμελής is literally "in the tune," that is, attuned to the general flow of the conversation, not jarring. Παρυπομνήσις is composed of παρά ("alongside") + ὑπό ("under") + μνῆσις ("recall"), that is, an alongside-underneath unobtrusive reminder. Marcus leaves the methodology open for other such techniques, not specifically named — for tact as a principle, not only for the three modes enumerated.

A note on Rogovin's translation. Rogovin here again shifts the subject (as in 01-08 and 01-09): "in such cases I, following him, try to use..." In the Greek it is a description of Alexander's method, not of Marcus's having-learned-from-Alexander. Long is closer to the original: "but dexterously to introduce the very expression..." — keeps the construction impersonal. In substance the difference is small, but Rogovin's systematic shift (three times: 01-08, 01-09, 01-10) marks his own translatorial disposition: to render Marcus as learned lessons, rather than as observed qualities in the teachers.

Biographical context: Alexander of Cotiaeum and Aelius Aristides. Rogovin's footnote ¹⁹ relies on Capitolinus (SHA Marcus, chs. 2–3): Alexander, a native of Phrygia, taught Marcus Greek, and is known for a commentary on Homer (the precise sub-sections to be verified against the Hohl Teubner edition [verify:hohl]). One may add: Alexander before Rome taught at Athens, where among his pupils was Aelius Aristides — the principal representative of the Second Sophistic of the second century, the orator of the Antonine age. On Alexander's death (approximately in the early 150s) Aristides delivered a funeral oration in his honour — the surviving "Ἐπιτάφιος εἰς Ἀλέξανδρον" (numbered Or. 32 in Behr). This is the principal external source on Alexander, documenting his reputation: wide Greek literary learning, exegetical work on Homer, the tactful pedagogic style which Marcus in 01-10 records as his own observation.

The shape of the inheritance from Alexander. Unlike Rusticus (doctrine), Apollonius (παράδειγμα ζῶν), Sextus (the social synthesis) — Alexander gives Marcus a pedagogical micro-ethic: how to interact with the interlocutor in the specific moment of correction. It is a fine, operational lesson: one manoeuvre in one situation (the answer to an erroneous utterance). Marcus thinks this micro-lesson important enough to devote a separate paragraph of Book I to it — which says something about its function for the future emperor: a huge part of imperial work consists of interactions with interlocutors who make mistakes (in fact, grammatically, politically) — and how the ruler effects the correction determines whether his relations with these people survive. Alexander's technique is imperial diplomacy in germ.

Parallels. SHA Marcus, chs. 2–3 — Alexander among Marcus's early teachers (Greek) and the mention of the Homer commentary. Aelius Aristides, the funeral oration (numbered Or. 32 in Behr) — the principal external source. Med. 1.17 — the thanks to the gods that Marcus did not go too far in rhetoric (i.e. stopped just at the level of grammar and did not become a rhetor-sophist). Med. 4.18 (on the theme: "how those who notice words differ from those who notice deeds") — the general Stoic programme of πρᾶγμα-vs-ῥῆμα. Med. 8.5 ("look clearly at the thing itself, not at those who speak of it") — the same distinction. Epict. Diss., book 1 — the Stoic didactic on the distinction between essence and form in dialectic.