Skopos literally means "the target," "that at which one looks and at which one aims." Its origin is in archery: the σκοπός is the wooden or leather shield at which the archer takes aim. Already in Homeric Greek the word acquires the figurative sense "the aim of an action," but as a technical term of Stoic ethics it is established by Antipater of Tarsus (2nd c. BCE): in the Stoic system σκοπός is the practical aim at which a particular act is directed — as distinct from τέλος, the final end (happiness, the smooth flow of life, life according to nature).

The distinction between τέλος and σκοπός is one of the finer Stoic constructions. The standard formula (Stob. Ecl. II 76 W, after Antipater):

• τέλος = "to obtain everything in accordance with nature";
• σκοπός = "to do everything that is up to us in order to obtain what is in accordance with nature."

The logic: τέλος includes the attainment (which is not entirely up to me — external circumstance may interfere); σκοπός is only the right taking-of-aim (which is entirely up to me). Hence the image of the archer: his σκοπός is to hit the target; if the wind carries the arrow off course he misses, but as an archer he is not at fault, because he aimed correctly. The moral worth of an action lies in the σκοπός, not in the result (Cic. De fin. III 22).

SVF III 2–19, 44 (the doctrine of τέλος and σκοπός); Antipater Tars. apud Stob. Ecl. II 76 W; Cic. De fin. III 22 ("ut si propositum sit sagittario aliquid ita ferire ut feriat" — "as if it were proposed to an archer to strike some mark in such a way that he hit it"); Sen. Ep. 71.3 ("for the one who does not know which port he is making for, no wind is his"); 95.5; LS 64. Skopos is a frequent term in Marcus: Med. 2.7; 2.16 (one of the worst things — to have no σκοπός); 4.32; 7.4; 7.55; 7.69; 8.7; 8.41 ("there is one σκοπός — the common benefit"); 10.37; 11.21 (the coherence of a life through a single σκοπός); 12.20 (no action without an end).

In 02-07 σκοπός is the single remedy for both ills of the passage: distraction by externals and aimless busyness. Marcus's logic: both symptoms (drift, ῥεμβόμενος, and circling, περιφορά — see aimless-wandering) are one and the same defect — the absence of a centre toward which all TERMimpulses and impressions are drawn. With a σκοπός in place, disorder is structurally impossible: every movement takes its direction from it.

A terminological subtlety: σκοπός vs. τέλος are not strict synonyms. In Marcus the two often overlap: he says that the sage's σκοπός is the common benefit, or life according to nature — which coincides with the τέλος formula. But the distinction is useful to grasp: σκοπός is what the sage holds in his sights; τέλος is what is properly "a life that has gone well." Taking aim (σκοπός) is an ethical act; hitting the mark (τέλος) is incidental, dependent on circumstance. Link with dichotomy-of-control: σκοπός lies in the sphere of "what is ours"; τέλος partly in the sphere of "what is not ours." For this reason the Stoic is answerable for σκοπός, not for τέλος.