MED. 4.12Discipline of action
George Long · 1862EN · Long

A man should always have these two EXERCISErules in readiness; the one, to do only whatever the TERMreason of the ruling and legislating faculty may suggest DOGMAfor the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, DOGMAnot because it appears pleasant or brings reputation.

Original · ancient Greek

Δύο ταύτας ἑτοιμότητας ἔχειν ἀεὶ δεῖ· τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξαι μόνον ὅπερ ἂν ὁ τῆς βασιλικῆς καὶ νομοθετικῆς λόγος ὑποβάλλῃ ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρώπων· τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸ μεταθέσθαι, ἐὰν ἄρα τις παρῇ διορθῶν καὶ μετάγων ἀπό τινος οἰήσεως. τὴν μέντοι μεταγωγὴν ἀεὶ ἀπό τινος πιθανότητος, ὡς δικαίου ἢ κοινωφελοῦς, γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ προηγμένα τοιαῦτα μόνον εἶναι δεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἡδὺ ἢ ἔνδοξον ἐφάνη.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

Genre and place in the book. A programmatic formula of the disciplines of action and assent: two "readinesses" (ἑτοιμότητες) to be kept always EXERCISEat hand. After the series on the wrongdoer and judgement (04-11), here is the make-up of a rightly working ruling part: how to act and how to revise.

The first readiness — action for the common good. To do only what the "kingly and legislative TERMreason" (ὁ βασιλικὸς καὶ νομοθετικὸς λόγος) suggests — that is, the ruling part described as king (self-governing) and lawgiver (giving itself its law) — and to do it ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρώπων, for the benefit of human beings. This is the discipline of action rooted in DOGMAthe social nature: every act is referred to the common good (cf. the single σκοπός — the common benefit).

The second readiness — openness to correction. To be ready to change one's mind (μεταθέσθαι) if someone is at hand to correct it and move one away from a "conceit" (οἴησις). This is the famous Stoic intellectual humility; the verbatim twin is Med. 6.21: "if anyone can show me that I think or act wrongly, I will gladly change, for I seek the truth, by which no one was ever harmed." Not obstinacy, but fidelity to the truth.

The criterion of revision. The subtlety lies in the ground: to change one's view only on the "persuasion" (πιθανότης) of the just (δίκαιον) or the common-beneficial (κοινωφελές) — not because a thing is pleasant (ἡδύ) or glorious (ἔνδοξον). Revision is subordinate to the good, not to pleasure and reputation — the latter being indifferents (cf. DOGMAvirtue-is-sufficient). Note the use of προηγμένα: here it is not strictly "preferred indifferents" (health, wealth — see axia), but "what is worth preferring" in a choice — and the criterion of preference is again the good, not pleasantness. (There is no separate term-card for προηγμένα; the concept lives in adiaphora/axia.)

The disciplines. The principal one is action (the first readiness: to act for the common good). The secondary is assent (the second readiness: to revise a judgement on the right ground).

Parallels. Gladly changing one's mind when shown to be wrong — Med. 6.21; 8.16. Acting for the common benefit by reason — Med. 8.7; 02-01; 02-16. Choosing by the just / common-good, not the pleasant / glorious — 03-06; cf. DOGMAvirtue-is-sufficient. The doctrine of προηγμένα — DL 7.105–107 (see axia).

DisciplineDiscipline of action
Record added2026-06-25
Statuspublished
Discipline of action

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

A man should always have these two EXERCISErules in readiness; the one, to do only whatever the TERMreason of the ruling and legislating faculty may suggest DOGMAfor the use of men; the other, to change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But this change of opinion must proceed only from a certain persuasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the like, DOGMAnot because it appears pleasant or brings reputation.

Original · ancient Greek

Δύο ταύτας ἑτοιμότητας ἔχειν ἀεὶ δεῖ· τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ πρᾶξαι μόνον ὅπερ ἂν ὁ τῆς βασιλικῆς καὶ νομοθετικῆς λόγος ὑποβάλλῃ ἐπʼ ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρώπων· τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸ μεταθέσθαι, ἐὰν ἄρα τις παρῇ διορθῶν καὶ μετάγων ἀπό τινος οἰήσεως. τὴν μέντοι μεταγωγὴν ἀεὶ ἀπό τινος πιθανότητος, ὡς δικαίου ἢ κοινωφελοῦς, γίνεσθαι καὶ τὰ προηγμένα τοιαῦτα μόνον εἶναι δεῖ, οὐχ ὅτι ἡδὺ ἢ ἔνδοξον ἐφάνη.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Related4
Commentary

Genre and place in the book. A programmatic formula of the disciplines of action and assent: two "readinesses" (ἑτοιμότητες) to be kept always EXERCISEat hand. After the series on the wrongdoer and judgement (04-11), here is the make-up of a rightly working ruling part: how to act and how to revise.

The first readiness — action for the common good. To do only what the "kingly and legislative TERMreason" (ὁ βασιλικὸς καὶ νομοθετικὸς λόγος) suggests — that is, the ruling part described as king (self-governing) and lawgiver (giving itself its law) — and to do it ἐπ' ὠφελείᾳ ἀνθρώπων, for the benefit of human beings. This is the discipline of action rooted in DOGMAthe social nature: every act is referred to the common good (cf. the single σκοπός — the common benefit).

The second readiness — openness to correction. To be ready to change one's mind (μεταθέσθαι) if someone is at hand to correct it and move one away from a "conceit" (οἴησις). This is the famous Stoic intellectual humility; the verbatim twin is Med. 6.21: "if anyone can show me that I think or act wrongly, I will gladly change, for I seek the truth, by which no one was ever harmed." Not obstinacy, but fidelity to the truth.

The criterion of revision. The subtlety lies in the ground: to change one's view only on the "persuasion" (πιθανότης) of the just (δίκαιον) or the common-beneficial (κοινωφελές) — not because a thing is pleasant (ἡδύ) or glorious (ἔνδοξον). Revision is subordinate to the good, not to pleasure and reputation — the latter being indifferents (cf. DOGMAvirtue-is-sufficient). Note the use of προηγμένα: here it is not strictly "preferred indifferents" (health, wealth — see axia), but "what is worth preferring" in a choice — and the criterion of preference is again the good, not pleasantness. (There is no separate term-card for προηγμένα; the concept lives in adiaphora/axia.)

The disciplines. The principal one is action (the first readiness: to act for the common good). The secondary is assent (the second readiness: to revise a judgement on the right ground).

Parallels. Gladly changing one's mind when shown to be wrong — Med. 6.21; 8.16. Acting for the common benefit by reason — Med. 8.7; 02-01; 02-16. Choosing by the just / common-good, not the pleasant / glorious — 03-06; cf. DOGMAvirtue-is-sufficient. The doctrine of προηγμένα — DL 7.105–107 (see axia).

DisciplineDiscipline of action
Record added2026-06-25
Statuspublished