MED. 4.7Discipline of assent
George Long · 1862EN · Long

Take away thy TERMopinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, "I have been harmed." Take away the complaint, "I have been harmed," and the DOGMAharm is taken away.

Original · ancient Greek

Ἆρον τὴν ὑπόληψιν, ἦρται τὸ βέβλαμμαι· ἆρον τὸ βέβλαμμαι, ἦρται ἡ βλάβη.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

Genre and place in the book. The most compressed formula-syllogism of the discipline of assent: two beats of ἆρονἦρται ("take away — it is taken away"), built on the single verb αἴρω. After the therapy of anger through nature and death (04-06), here the mechanism itself is laid bare: where harm actually "lives."

The two-step logic. (1) Ἆρον τὴν TERMὑπόληψινἦρται τὸ βέβλαμμαι: take away the evaluative judgement, and "I have been harmed" vanishes. (2) Ἆρον τὸ βέβλαμμαιἦρται ἡ βλάβη: let the complaint go, and the harm itself is gone. The chain runs in reverse of the genesis of a passion: harm (βλάβη) rests on the feeling "I have been wronged" (βέβλαμμαι), and that on the TERMjudgement (ὑπόληψις). Remove the root and the whole tree falls.

πάντα ὑπόληψις. This is a special case of Marcus's programmatic formula "all is judgement" (02-15; Med. 12.8; 12.22): things have no intrinsic affective charge; "harm" is ascribed by the ruling part itself. The verbatim twins are Med. 4.39 ("the evil is only in that part of you which forms opinions about evils; let it not form them, and all is well"), 8.47 ("it is not the thing that pains you but your judgement of it, and you can wipe it out at once"), 8.40. The source of the doctrine is Epictetus Ench. 5: "people are disturbed not by things but by their opinions about things."

What "harm" (βλάβη) means. Two doctrines meet here. The DOGMAdichotomy of control: good and evil lie only in what is up to us (judgement), while the external is neither. And DOGMAinvulnerability: real harm = vice = one's own assent to the bad, and no external force "harms" so long as the ruling part does not yield (ἀβλαβής). The βλάβη of 4.7 is not bodily damage but an "evil" constituted by judgement — which is why it is removed together with the judgement.

The exercise. The imperative Ἆρον ("take away!") is the operation of the discipline of assent: to strip the evaluative overlay from an impression and see it without the ascribed "harm." This is EXERCISEthe bare definition (Hadot's définition physique), the exercise of the "stripped-down view" that removes the evaluative admixture from an impression. 4.7 gives it in its most general form: not "describe the thing as matter" but simply "remove the judgement." The precondition of any such operation is ἀπροπτωσία (non-rash assent): not to fix a judgement before it has been examined.

The disciplines. The principal one is assent: its object is the ὑπόληψις. The secondary is desire: the removed judgement also dissolves the passion, since "I have been harmed" is a πάθος of distress and aversion.

Parallels. Not things but judgements disturb us — Epict. Ench. 5; Med. 8.47; 4.39; 8.40. "All is judgement" — 02-15; Med. 12.8; 12.22. Things do not touch the soul — 04-03; Med. 5.19. The invulnerability of one who keeps his judgement right — Plato Apol. 30c–d; Med. 2.1; 7.16; Seneca De const. sap.

DisciplineDiscipline of assent
Record added2026-06-24
Statuspublished
Discipline of assent

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

Take away thy TERMopinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, "I have been harmed." Take away the complaint, "I have been harmed," and the DOGMAharm is taken away.

Original · ancient Greek

Ἆρον τὴν ὑπόληψιν, ἦρται τὸ βέβλαμμαι· ἆρον τὸ βέβλαμμαι, ἦρται ἡ βλάβη.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Related4
Commentary

Genre and place in the book. The most compressed formula-syllogism of the discipline of assent: two beats of ἆρονἦρται ("take away — it is taken away"), built on the single verb αἴρω. After the therapy of anger through nature and death (04-06), here the mechanism itself is laid bare: where harm actually "lives."

The two-step logic. (1) Ἆρον τὴν TERMὑπόληψινἦρται τὸ βέβλαμμαι: take away the evaluative judgement, and "I have been harmed" vanishes. (2) Ἆρον τὸ βέβλαμμαιἦρται ἡ βλάβη: let the complaint go, and the harm itself is gone. The chain runs in reverse of the genesis of a passion: harm (βλάβη) rests on the feeling "I have been wronged" (βέβλαμμαι), and that on the TERMjudgement (ὑπόληψις). Remove the root and the whole tree falls.

πάντα ὑπόληψις. This is a special case of Marcus's programmatic formula "all is judgement" (02-15; Med. 12.8; 12.22): things have no intrinsic affective charge; "harm" is ascribed by the ruling part itself. The verbatim twins are Med. 4.39 ("the evil is only in that part of you which forms opinions about evils; let it not form them, and all is well"), 8.47 ("it is not the thing that pains you but your judgement of it, and you can wipe it out at once"), 8.40. The source of the doctrine is Epictetus Ench. 5: "people are disturbed not by things but by their opinions about things."

What "harm" (βλάβη) means. Two doctrines meet here. The DOGMAdichotomy of control: good and evil lie only in what is up to us (judgement), while the external is neither. And DOGMAinvulnerability: real harm = vice = one's own assent to the bad, and no external force "harms" so long as the ruling part does not yield (ἀβλαβής). The βλάβη of 4.7 is not bodily damage but an "evil" constituted by judgement — which is why it is removed together with the judgement.

The exercise. The imperative Ἆρον ("take away!") is the operation of the discipline of assent: to strip the evaluative overlay from an impression and see it without the ascribed "harm." This is EXERCISEthe bare definition (Hadot's définition physique), the exercise of the "stripped-down view" that removes the evaluative admixture from an impression. 4.7 gives it in its most general form: not "describe the thing as matter" but simply "remove the judgement." The precondition of any such operation is ἀπροπτωσία (non-rash assent): not to fix a judgement before it has been examined.

The disciplines. The principal one is assent: its object is the ὑπόληψις. The secondary is desire: the removed judgement also dissolves the passion, since "I have been harmed" is a πάθος of distress and aversion.

Parallels. Not things but judgements disturb us — Epict. Ench. 5; Med. 8.47; 4.39; 8.40. "All is judgement" — 02-15; Med. 12.8; 12.22. Things do not touch the soul — 04-03; Med. 5.19. The invulnerability of one who keeps his judgement right — Plato Apol. 30c–d; Med. 2.1; 7.16; Seneca De const. sap.

DisciplineDiscipline of assent
Record added2026-06-24
Statuspublished