Some things are up to us (τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν); others are not (τὰ οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν). Up to us are opinion, impulse, desire, aversion — in a word, whatever is our own doing. Not up to us are the body, property, reputation, office — in a word, whatever is not our own doing. Good and evil lie only in what is up to us; in everything else there is neither good nor evil.

Canonically formulated by Epictetus at the opening of the Enchiridion (Ench. 1). The formula does not occur as such in Marcus, but pervades the whole book: 6.41; 8.7; 11.37; 12.22. It goes back to the classical Stoic doctrine of freedom (ἐλευθερία) as unattachment to externals.

The modern literature distinguishes a "strict" and a "soft" version of the doctrine: does "what is up to us" cover only acts of judgment and assent (the narrow reading, the TERMhegemonikon) or actions as well (the broader reading)? Marcus apparently holds the narrow version.