The dilemma of pain. A rigorous analysis (διαίρεσις): TERMpain (πόνος) is "an evil either to the body or to the TERMsoul." If to the body — "let the body declare it" (ἀποφαινέσθω): that is its affair, a physiological signal, not a verdict of evil. If it claims to be an evil "to the soul" — here freedom enters: the soul "can (ἔξεστιν) keep its own TERMclear sky (αἰθρία) and calm (γαλήνη)" and "not suppose it an evil" (μὴ ὑπολαμβάνειν ὅτι κακόν). The pain exists — the judgment of its "evilness" need not.

Nothing ascends within. The ground is the topology of the soul: "every DOGMAjudgment, impulse, desire, and aversion is within (ἔνδον), and nothing ascends here (οὐδὲν ὧδε ἀναβαίνει)." Bodily sensation knocks from outside, but into the citadel of the DOGMAruling part it does not by itself enter — only when admitted by assent. Hence evil does not "climb" to the rational part unless that part opens the gate (cf. 7.16 — the ruling part makes no need for itself; 7.33 — calm to the mind by walling off; the "citadel," 8.48). The strict terms by the word are ψυχή, κακόν, γαλήνη. The governing discipline is assent (not to judge pain an evil), the sustaining one desire (not to fear the bodily).