Meditations VIII.1: "This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of…" — Marcus Aurelius

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Read/Book VIII/8.1

MED. 8.1Discipline of desire

George Long · 1862EN · Long

This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher; but both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem to others, and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as DOGMAthy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having found happiness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing what TERMman's nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has principles from which come TERMhis affects and his acts. What principles? Those which relate to TERMgood and TERMbad: the belief that there is nothing good for man, DOGMAwhich does not make him just, temperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad, which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned.

George Long · 1862EN · Long

This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher; but both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem to others, and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as DOGMAthy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having found happiness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing what TERMman's nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has principles from which come TERMhis affects and his acts. What principles? Those which relate to TERMgood and TERMbad: the belief that there is nothing good for man, DOGMAwhich does not make him just, temperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad, which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned.

Modern EnglishEN · Modern

This reflection too helps toward freedom from vainglory: that you can no longer have lived your whole life, or at least your life from youth on, as a philosopher; to many others, and to yourself, it is plain that you are far from philosophy. You are muddled, then, so that the reputation of a philosopher is no longer easy to gain — and your station in life works against it too. If, then, you have truly seen where the matter lies, drop the question of how you will seem, and be content if you can live the rest of your life, however much is left, as DOGMAyour nature wills. Consider, then, what it wills, and let nothing else distract you; for you have tried many paths and, wandering through them, found the good life nowhere — not in syllogisms, not in wealth, not in fame, not in enjoyment, nowhere. Where is it then? In doing what TERMman's nature seeks. How will you do this? If you hold doctrines from which spring TERMyour impulses and acts. What doctrines? Those about TERMgood and TERMevil: that nothing is good for a human being DOGMAbut what makes him just, temperate, brave, free, and nothing evil but what makes him the opposite.

Original · ancient Greek

Καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἀκενόδοξον φέρει, ὅτι οὐκέτι δύνασαι τὸν βίον ὅλον ἢ τόν γε ἀπὸ νεότητος φιλόσοφον βεβιωκέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτὸς σεαυτῷ δῆλος γέγονας πόρρω φιλοσοφίας ὤν. πέφυρσαι οὖν, ὥστε τὴν μὲν δόξαν τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου κτήσασθαι οὐκέτι σοι ῥᾴδιον· ἀνταγωνίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις. εἴπερ οὖν ἀληθῶς ἑώρακας ποῦ κεῖται τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μὲν τί δόξεις ἄφες, ἀρκέσθητι δέ, εἰ κἂν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου ὅσον δήποτε, ὡς ἡ σὴ φύσις θέλει, βιώσῃ. κατανόησον οὖν τί θέλει, καὶ ἄλλο μηδέν σε περισπάτω· πεπείρασαι γὰρ περὶ πόσα πλανηθεὶς οὐδαμοῦ εὗρες τὸ εὖ ζῆν, οὐκ ἐν συλλογισμοῖς, οὐκ ἐν πλούτῳ, οὐκ ἐν δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐν ἀπολαύσει, οὐδαμοῦ. ποῦ οὖν ἐστιν; ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ἃ ἐπιζητεῖ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ποιήσεις; ἐὰν δόγματα ἔχῃς ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ ὁρμαὶ καὶ αἱ πράξεις. τίνα δόγματα; περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ὡς οὐδενὸς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος ἀνθρώπῳ ὃ οὐχὶ ποιεῖ δίκαιον, σώφρονα, ἀνδρεῖον, ἐλεύθερον, οὐδενὸς δὲ κακοῦ ὃ οὐχὶ ποιεῖ τἀναντία τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

Leopold · Teubner 1908

Commentary

Against vainglory — from an unexpected angle. The passage opens Book VIII's series of self-admonitions. The first argument "toward freedom from conceit" (πρὸς τὸ ἀκενόδοξον) sounds almost bitter: you can no longer have lived a whole life as a philosopher, the sage's repute is beyond you — "your station opposes it too" (ἡ ὑπόθεσις, the imperial office). Yet the very thing that bars the road to the fame of philosophy frees one from caring about it: if it is too late to play the part, drop "how you will seem" (τὸ τί δόξεις) and attend to the substance.

Where the good life is — by elimination and remainder. The classic Stoic argument from exclusion: the good is found "nowhere" (οὐδαμοῦ twice, οὐκ ἐν four times) — not in syllogisms (even logic is not the end), not in wealth (dropped by Rogovin), fame, or enjoyment. One thing is left: "to do what TERMman's nature seeks" (cf. 7.55: where nature leads you). And that is reached only through doctrines (δόγματα) — the beliefs about TERMgood and TERMevil "from which the TERMimpulses (ὁρμαί) and acts" flow. The causal order: right teaching → right impulse → right deed.

The core — the sufficiency of virtue. The closing formula compresses DOGMAthe sufficiency of virtue: the good for a human being is only what makes him "just, temperate, brave, free" (δίκαιον, σώφρονα, ἀνδρεῖον, ἐλεύθερον — three cardinal virtues, with freedom in place of wisdom); evil, only the contrary. All else is indifferent. The governing discipline is desire (what to count as good), the sustaining one action (the acts that follow from the doctrines).

Read·Book VIII

Discipline of desire

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

This reflection also tends to the removal of the desire of empty fame, that it is no longer in thy power to have lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life from thy youth upwards, like a philosopher; but both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a philosopher; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw away the thought, How thou shalt seem to others, and be content if thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as DOGMAthy nature wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else distract thee; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings without having found happiness anywhere, not in syllogisms, nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor anywhere. Where is it then? In doing what TERMman's nature requires. How then shall a man do this? If he has principles from which come TERMhis affects and his acts. What principles? Those which relate to TERMgood and TERMbad: the belief that there is nothing good for man, DOGMAwhich does not make him just, temperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad, which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned.

Original · ancient Greek

Καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ ἀκενόδοξον φέρει, ὅτι οὐκέτι δύνασαι τὸν βίον ὅλον ἢ τόν γε ἀπὸ νεότητος φιλόσοφον βεβιωκέναι, ἀλλὰ πολλοῖς τε ἄλλοις καὶ αὐτὸς σεαυτῷ δῆλος γέγονας πόρρω φιλοσοφίας ὤν. πέφυρσαι οὖν, ὥστε τὴν μὲν δόξαν τὴν τοῦ φιλοσόφου κτήσασθαι οὐκέτι σοι ῥᾴδιον· ἀνταγωνίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ὑπόθεσις. εἴπερ οὖν ἀληθῶς ἑώρακας ποῦ κεῖται τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μὲν τί δόξεις ἄφες, ἀρκέσθητι δέ, εἰ κἂν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῦ βίου ὅσον δήποτε, ὡς ἡ σὴ φύσις θέλει, βιώσῃ. κατανόησον οὖν τί θέλει, καὶ ἄλλο μηδέν σε περισπάτω· πεπείρασαι γὰρ περὶ πόσα πλανηθεὶς οὐδαμοῦ εὗρες τὸ εὖ ζῆν, οὐκ ἐν συλλογισμοῖς, οὐκ ἐν πλούτῳ, οὐκ ἐν δόξῃ, οὐκ ἐν ἀπολαύσει, οὐδαμοῦ. ποῦ οὖν ἐστιν; ἐν τῷ ποιεῖν ἃ ἐπιζητεῖ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις. πῶς οὖν ταῦτα ποιήσεις; ἐὰν δόγματα ἔχῃς ἀφ’ ὧν αἱ ὁρμαὶ καὶ αἱ πράξεις. τίνα δόγματα; περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, ὡς οὐδενὸς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ ὄντος ἀνθρώπῳ ὃ οὐχὶ ποιεῖ δίκαιον, σώφρονα, ἀνδρεῖον, ἐλεύθερον, οὐδενὸς δὲ κακοῦ ὃ οὐχὶ ποιεῖ τἀναντία τοῖς εἰρημένοις.

Leopold · Teubner 1908

Related6

TERMἀγαθόνthe good TERMκακόνevil, the bad TERMφύσιςnature TERMὁρμήimpulse DOGMAVirtue is sufficient for happiness DOGMATo live according to nature — the Stoic *telos*-formula

Commentary

Against vainglory — from an unexpected angle. The passage opens Book VIII's series of self-admonitions. The first argument "toward freedom from conceit" (πρὸς τὸ ἀκενόδοξον) sounds almost bitter: you can no longer have lived a whole life as a philosopher, the sage's repute is beyond you — "your station opposes it too" (ἡ ὑπόθεσις, the imperial office). Yet the very thing that bars the road to the fame of philosophy frees one from caring about it: if it is too late to play the part, drop "how you will seem" (τὸ τί δόξεις) and attend to the substance.

Where the good life is — by elimination and remainder. The classic Stoic argument from exclusion: the good is found "nowhere" (οὐδαμοῦ twice, οὐκ ἐν four times) — not in syllogisms (even logic is not the end), not in wealth (dropped by Rogovin), fame, or enjoyment. One thing is left: "to do what TERMman's nature seeks" (cf. 7.55: where nature leads you). And that is reached only through doctrines (δόγματα) — the beliefs about TERMgood and TERMevil "from which the TERMimpulses (ὁρμαί) and acts" flow. The causal order: right teaching → right impulse → right deed.

The core — the sufficiency of virtue. The closing formula compresses DOGMAthe sufficiency of virtue: the good for a human being is only what makes him "just, temperate, brave, free" (δίκαιον, σώφρονα, ἀνδρεῖον, ἐλεύθερον — three cardinal virtues, with freedom in place of wisdom); evil, only the contrary. All else is indifferent. The governing discipline is desire (what to count as good), the sustaining one action (the acts that follow from the doctrines).

DisciplineDiscipline of desire

Record added2026-07-16

Statuspublished