Evil is the opposite of TERMthe good: what harms and cannot be put to good use. The only genuine evil is vice (TERMκακία) and what partakes in it: folly, intemperance, injustice, cowardice. Sickness, death, disgrace — these are not evils but "indifferents" (often "dispreferred," ἀποπροηγμένον). Evil, like good, is localised exclusively in the ruling part: only acts of one's own assent (συγκατάθεσις) can make a person bad.

SVF III 74–77; DL VII 94–101; Stob. Ecl. II 57–58 W; LS 60. In Marcus: Med. 2.1; 2.11; 4.8; 9.42.

In 02-01 evil is characterised as αἰσχρόν — shameful. This pair ἀγαθόν/καλόν — κακόν/αἰσχρόν goes back to Socrates (see Plat. Gorg. 474c–475e) and becomes a technical argument in the Stoics: since evil is only what is shameful (i.e. morally bad), it cannot be imposed by another person, and so wrongdoers remain the victims of their own TERMignorance.