For the Stoics, the good is what benefits and cannot be put to evil use; strictly speaking, the only good is TERMvirtue (ἀρετή) and what partakes in it. Everything external — health, wealth, reputation — belongs to the indifferents (ἀδιάφορα), though it may be "preferred" (προηγμένον). The good is inseparable from the fine (καλόν): what is good is also noble.

SVF III 74–77 (Chrysippus); DL VII 94–101; Stob. Ecl. II 69–70 W; LS 60. In Marcus: Med. 2.1; 2.11; 5.15; 6.41.

In passage 02-01 Marcus relies on the classical Stoic identification of the good with the fine (καλόν): "the nature of the good is that it is fine; the nature of evil, that it is shameful." This knowledge — knowledge of the very TERMnature of good and evil — frees the sage from being harmed, because genuine harm is possible only in the sphere of TERMevil, that is, of vice, and vice cannot be imposed from outside (see no-harm-to-virtuous).