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Read/Book V/5.15
MED. 5.15Discipline of desire
George Long · 1862EN · Long

None of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does TERMman's nature promise them, nor are they the means of DOGMAman's nature attaining its end. Neither, therefore, is TERMthe end of man placed in these things, nor yet that which is completive of the end, which is TERMthe good. Besides, if any of these things did belong to a man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good. But now DOGMAthe more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better man.

(Long; выверено по тексту, кроме фразы о τέλος/благе)

Original · ancient Greek

Οὐδὲν τούτων ῥητέον ἀνθρώπου, ἃ ἀνθρώπῳ, καθὸ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἐπιβάλλει. οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπαιτήματα ἀνθρώπου οὐδὲ ἐπαγγέλλεται αὐτὰ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις οὐδὲ τελειότητές εἰσι τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ τέλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κείμενον οὐδέ γε τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ τέλους, τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ εἴ τι τούτων ἦν ἐπιβάλλον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὑπερφρονεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ κατεξανίστασθαι ἐπιβάλλον ἦν οὐδὲ ἐπαινετὸς ἦν ὁ ἀπροσδεῆ τούτων ἑαυτὸν παρεχόμενος, οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ ἐλαττωτικὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἔν τινι τούτων ἀγαθὸς ἦν, εἴπερ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἦν. νῦν δ, ὅσῳπερ πλείω τις ἀφαιρῶν ἑαυτοῦ τούτων ἢ τοιούτων ἑτέρων ἢ καὶ ἀφαιρούμενός τι τούτων ἀνέχηται, τοσῷδε μᾶλλον ἀγαθός ἐστιν.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

Place in the book. Value theory in pure form: the external is not proper to man as man, there is in it neither end nor good — and the more fully you renounce it, the better you are. The discipline of desire (what to count as good), resting on assent (the evaluative judgment).

Not proper to man. The external (wealth, fame, and the like) is not "man's own" (ἀνθρώπου): it does not befit man as man, is not among his "requirements" (ἀπαιτήματα), is not promised by TERMman's nature, and is not a DOGMAperfection of man's nature (τελειότης). The measure of the human is one's rational-social nature, not one's possessions.

Neither end nor good. Hence: man's TERMend (τέλος) does not lie in the external — nor does "that which completes the end" (τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ τέλους), namely TERMthe good (τὸ ἀγαθόν). The good is what completes the τέλος; the external does not complete it, and so is not a good.

The argument from praise. A subtle reductio: if the external were a good, then (a) to despise it and rise up against it would be unfitting; (b) one who shows himself independent of it would not be praiseworthy; (c) one who stints himself in it would not be good. But we do praise renunciation — so the external is not a good. And the seal: DOGMAthe more a man takes these things away from himself (or calmly bears their being taken), the better (ἀγαθός) he is. Our own valuations betray the true axiology.

Value theory. The good is virtue (DOGMAonly the noble is good); the external is indifferent (the word ἀδιάφορα is absent, but this is precisely the doctrine); the human τέλος is life according to DOGMAnature, not acquisition. Cf. 05-12: the "goods of the many" are not real goods.

Discipline and parallels. The principal discipline is desire (the revision of what to value); the secondary is assent (the judgment of the good). Parallel: Med. 5.12 (05-12).

DisciplineDiscipline of desire
Record added2026-07-11
Statuspublished
Read·Book V
Discipline of desire

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

None of these things ought to be called a man's, which do not belong to a man, as man. They are not required of a man, nor does TERMman's nature promise them, nor are they the means of DOGMAman's nature attaining its end. Neither, therefore, is TERMthe end of man placed in these things, nor yet that which is completive of the end, which is TERMthe good. Besides, if any of these things did belong to a man, it would not be right for a man to despise them and to set himself against them; nor would a man be worthy of praise who showed that he did not want these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of them be good, if indeed these things were good. But now DOGMAthe more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the same degree he is a better man.

(Long; выверено по тексту, кроме фразы о τέλος/благе)

Original · ancient Greek

Οὐδὲν τούτων ῥητέον ἀνθρώπου, ἃ ἀνθρώπῳ, καθὸ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν, οὐκ ἐπιβάλλει. οὐκ ἔστιν ἀπαιτήματα ἀνθρώπου οὐδὲ ἐπαγγέλλεται αὐτὰ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσις οὐδὲ τελειότητές εἰσι τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεως. οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τὸ τέλος ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστι τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ κείμενον οὐδέ γε τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ τέλους, τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἐπεὶ εἴ τι τούτων ἦν ἐπιβάλλον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, οὐκ ἂν τὸ ὑπερφρονεῖν αὐτῶν καὶ κατεξανίστασθαι ἐπιβάλλον ἦν οὐδὲ ἐπαινετὸς ἦν ὁ ἀπροσδεῆ τούτων ἑαυτὸν παρεχόμενος, οὐδ’ ἂν ὁ ἐλαττωτικὸς ἑαυτοῦ ἔν τινι τούτων ἀγαθὸς ἦν, εἴπερ ταῦτα ἀγαθὰ ἦν. νῦν δ, ὅσῳπερ πλείω τις ἀφαιρῶν ἑαυτοῦ τούτων ἢ τοιούτων ἑτέρων ἢ καὶ ἀφαιρούμενός τι τούτων ἀνέχηται, τοσῷδε μᾶλλον ἀγαθός ἐστιν.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Related5
TERMφύσιςnatureTERMτέλοςend, final end, telosTERMἀγαθόνthe goodDOGMAVirtue is sufficient for happinessDOGMATo live according to nature — the Stoic *telos*-formula
Commentary

Place in the book. Value theory in pure form: the external is not proper to man as man, there is in it neither end nor good — and the more fully you renounce it, the better you are. The discipline of desire (what to count as good), resting on assent (the evaluative judgment).

Not proper to man. The external (wealth, fame, and the like) is not "man's own" (ἀνθρώπου): it does not befit man as man, is not among his "requirements" (ἀπαιτήματα), is not promised by TERMman's nature, and is not a DOGMAperfection of man's nature (τελειότης). The measure of the human is one's rational-social nature, not one's possessions.

Neither end nor good. Hence: man's TERMend (τέλος) does not lie in the external — nor does "that which completes the end" (τὸ συμπληρωτικὸν τοῦ τέλους), namely TERMthe good (τὸ ἀγαθόν). The good is what completes the τέλος; the external does not complete it, and so is not a good.

The argument from praise. A subtle reductio: if the external were a good, then (a) to despise it and rise up against it would be unfitting; (b) one who shows himself independent of it would not be praiseworthy; (c) one who stints himself in it would not be good. But we do praise renunciation — so the external is not a good. And the seal: DOGMAthe more a man takes these things away from himself (or calmly bears their being taken), the better (ἀγαθός) he is. Our own valuations betray the true axiology.

Value theory. The good is virtue (DOGMAonly the noble is good); the external is indifferent (the word ἀδιάφορα is absent, but this is precisely the doctrine); the human τέλος is life according to DOGMAnature, not acquisition. Cf. 05-12: the "goods of the many" are not real goods.

Discipline and parallels. The principal discipline is desire (the revision of what to value); the secondary is assent (the judgment of the good). Parallel: Med. 5.12 (05-12).

DisciplineDiscipline of desire
Record added2026-07-11
Statuspublished