One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready to set it down to his account as a favour conferred. Another is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind he thinks of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he has done. A third in a manner does not even know what he has done, but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit. MOTIFAs a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he has done a good act, does not call out for others to come and see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine goes on to produce again the grapes in season.- Must a man then be one of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it?- Yes.- But this very thing is necessary, the EXERCISEobservation of what a man is doing: for, it may be said, it is characteristic of TERMthe social animal to perceive that he is working in a social manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also should perceive it.- It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost not rightly understand what is now said: and for this reason thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said, do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act.

One man, when he has done another a service, is ready to enter it on the account as a favour owed. Another is not so ready, yet in his own mind he still counts the man his debtor, and is well aware of what he has done. A third, in a way, does not even know what he has done: he is like a vine that has produced its grapes and looks for nothing more once it has borne its proper fruit. MOTIFAs a horse that has run, a dog that has tracked its game, a bee that has made its honey — so a man who has done a good deed does not shout for others to come and see, but passes on to the next, as the vine passes on to bear its grapes again in season. — So must one be among those who, in a way, act like this without noticing it? — Yes. — But surely this very thing is needed, the EXERCISEnoticing of what one is doing; for (it is said) it belongs to TERMthe social being to perceive that it is acting socially, and, by the gods, to want its partner to perceive it too. — What you say is true, but you mistake the present point; and for this you will become one of those I mentioned before — for they too are led astray by a certain plausibility of reasoning. If instead you are willing to grasp what is being said, have no fear that on this account you will leave any social act undone.