Place in the book. On the true good (virtue) against apparent goods (externals) — with an unexpected instrument: a crude comic line. The disciplines are desire (what the good is) and assent (the evaluative judgment, ὑπόληψις).

A test for the real good. Conceive "what is truly good" (DOGMAὡς ἀληθῶς ἀγαθά) — the four cardinal virtues: TERMφρόνησις (prudence), TERMσωφροσύνη (temperance), TERMδικαιοσύνη (justice), TERMἀνδρεία (courage) — and the comic tag «ὑπὸ τῶν ἀγαθῶν» ("thanks to his goods…") will not stick to them: it does not fit. But conceive TERMthe "goods" of the many, and the same line lies snugly.

The comic line as a criterion. The comic tag — «οὐκ ἔχειν ὅποι χέσῃ» ("so rich he has nowhere to relieve himself") — is deliberately crude; Marcus quotes it unsoftened. Its aptness for wealth and fame, and its sheer absurdity for the virtues, is the proof: even the many secretly "represent" (φαντάζονται) the difference. The jest offends applied to virtue and delights applied to money — so the very laughers have already passed an TERMevaluative judgment (ὑπόληψις): externals are not goods.

The argument from consent. Marcus turns vulgar comedy into a philosophical criterion: the language and laughter of "the many" betray their latent value-theory. One who "honours and reckons as good" (τιμητέον καὶ ἀγαθὰ ὑποληπτέον) wealth would fittingly apply the latrine-joke to his idol — and not wince.

Value theory. The real good is virtue (DOGMAonly the noble is good); wealth, luxury, fame are not goods but indifferents. Cf. 03-06: if you find anything better than justice, truth, temperance, courage — turn to it; but nothing is better.

Discipline and parallels. The principal discipline is desire (the revision of what to value as good); the secondary is assent (the ὑπόληψις of the good). Parallel: Med. 3.6 (03-06) — the rejection of power, wealth, and pleasure as goods.