TERM

δικαιοσύνη (δικαιότης у Марка)

dikaiosynē
RU

справедливость

EN

justice

§ IDefinition

Justice is one of the four cardinal virtues of the Stoic system (alongside φρόνησις — practical wisdom, ἀνδρεία — courage, σωφροσύνη — temperance). Chrysippus defined δικαιοσύνη as ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ — "the knowledge of how to distribute to each what he deserves." In the Stoic system it is not one of four "separate" virtues but an aspect of the single virtue, the aspect specifically tied to the social nature of the human being: justice is the manner in which practical reason is realised in social relations.

§ IISource

SVF III 262–294 (the doctrine of the four virtues); III 264 (the definition of δικαιοσύνη); DL VII 92–94; Stob. Ecl. II 59–60 W; LS 61. The Platonic background: Resp. IV 433a–434c. Aristotle: Eth. Nic. V in its entirety. In Marcus the form δικαιότης (a contraction of δικαιοσύνη) at Med. 2.5; 3.6; 09-31 (δικαιότης in what is "from your own cause": justice as the discipline of action); 10.11; 12.15. The full form δικαιοσύνη — 05-12 (among the true goods is δικαιοσύνη, against the seeming goods of the many); 05-34 (the good lies in a just disposition and action, ἐν διαθέσει δικαίᾳ); 06-47 (to live μετ’ ἀληθείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, benevolent even to liars); 06-50 (to act when ὁ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγος leads); 07-54 (κατὰ δικαιοσύνην toward the people at hand — the second member of the triad); 07-63 (souls are deprived of δικαιοσύνη too against their will — hence gentleness); 08-39 (δικαιοσύνη has no counter-virtue in the rational constitution — there is no "too much" of it).

§ IIINotes

In 02-05 δικαιότης rounds off the quartet of virtue-tonalities in which one is to act: σεμνότης (dignity), φιλοστοργία (natural affection), ἐλευθερία (freedom), δικαιότης (justice). The inclusion of justice is a structural turn: virtuous action in Marcus is inseparable from "social rightness." Cf. Med. 11.10 — the famous formula: "δικαιοσύνη is not one of the virtues; it is virtue in its social dimension; all the rest (courage, temperance, prudence) are its preconditions." Related to DOGMAoikeiosis (the ontological ground of social ethics) and TERMsynergia (its active expression).

TERM

δικαιοσύνη (δικαιότης у Марка)

dikaiosynē
RU

справедливость

EN

justice

Appears in21
Related3
Sections3

§ IDefinition

Justice is one of the four cardinal virtues of the Stoic system (alongside φρόνησις — practical wisdom, ἀνδρεία — courage, σωφροσύνη — temperance). Chrysippus defined δικαιοσύνη as ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ — "the knowledge of how to distribute to each what he deserves." In the Stoic system it is not one of four "separate" virtues but an aspect of the single virtue, the aspect specifically tied to the social nature of the human being: justice is the manner in which practical reason is realised in social relations.

§ IISource

SVF III 262–294 (the doctrine of the four virtues); III 264 (the definition of δικαιοσύνη); DL VII 92–94; Stob. Ecl. II 59–60 W; LS 61. The Platonic background: Resp. IV 433a–434c. Aristotle: Eth. Nic. V in its entirety. In Marcus the form δικαιότης (a contraction of δικαιοσύνη) at Med. 2.5; 3.6; 09-31 (δικαιότης in what is "from your own cause": justice as the discipline of action); 10.11; 12.15. The full form δικαιοσύνη — 05-12 (among the true goods is δικαιοσύνη, against the seeming goods of the many); 05-34 (the good lies in a just disposition and action, ἐν διαθέσει δικαίᾳ); 06-47 (to live μετ’ ἀληθείας καὶ δικαιοσύνης, benevolent even to liars); 06-50 (to act when ὁ τῆς δικαιοσύνης λόγος leads); 07-54 (κατὰ δικαιοσύνην toward the people at hand — the second member of the triad); 07-63 (souls are deprived of δικαιοσύνη too against their will — hence gentleness); 08-39 (δικαιοσύνη has no counter-virtue in the rational constitution — there is no "too much" of it).

§ IIINotes

In 02-05 δικαιότης rounds off the quartet of virtue-tonalities in which one is to act: σεμνότης (dignity), φιλοστοργία (natural affection), ἐλευθερία (freedom), δικαιότης (justice). The inclusion of justice is a structural turn: virtuous action in Marcus is inseparable from "social rightness." Cf. Med. 11.10 — the famous formula: "δικαιοσύνη is not one of the virtues; it is virtue in its social dimension; all the rest (courage, temperance, prudence) are its preconditions." Related to DOGMAoikeiosis (the ontological ground of social ethics) and TERMsynergia (its active expression).

Related3
Appears in21
1.14From my brother Severus​, to love my kin, and to love truth, and to love justice; and through him I learned to know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus​; and…2.5Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and freedom, and justic…3.4Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others, when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility. For thou losest the opp…3.6If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own mind's self-satisfaction …3.11To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still be added:- Make for thyself a definition or description of the thing which is presented to thee, so as …3.16Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belong sensations, to the soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To receive the impressions of forms by means of …4.3Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores, and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. But this is altogethe…4.4If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in respect of which we are rational beings, is common: if this is so, common also is the reason which comma…4.10Consider that everything which happens, happens justly, and if thou observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so. I do not say only with respect to the conti…5.12How the things which seem good to most men might be shown to be otherwise, a man may learn from this. If a man should conceive certain things as being really go…5.34Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness, if thou canst go by the right way, and think and act in the right way. These two things are common bot…6.47Think continually that all kinds of men and of all kinds of pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts come down even to Philistion and Phoebus …6.50Let us try to persuade them (men). But act even against their will, when the principles of justice lead that way. If however any man by using force stands in th…7.42For the good is with me, and the just. (Long)7.44From Plato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good for anything at all ough…7.54Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to acquiesce in thy present condition, and to behave justly to those who are about thee, and to exert thy…7.63Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived of truth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of justice and temperance and benevolence and …8.5This is the chief thing: Be not perturbed, for all things are according to the nature of the universal; and in a little time thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, li…8.39In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, and that is tem…9.31Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to the things which come from the external cause; and let there be justice in the things done by virtue of …9.34What are these men's leading principles, and about what kind of things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons do they love and honour? Imagine that thou se…
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