MED. 7.44Discipline of action
George Long · 1862EN · Long

From PERSONPlato: But I would make this man a sufficient answer, which is this: Thou sayest not well, if thou thinkest that a man who is good for anything at all ought to compute DOGMAthe hazard of life or death, and should not rather look to this only in all that he does, DOGMAwhether he is doing what is just or unjust, and the works of a good or bad man.

Original · ancient Greek

ʽἘγὼ δὲ τούτῳ δίκαιον ἂν λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ‹ἔργα› ἢ κακοῦ

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

The core of the Plato series. A verbatim excerpt from the Apology (28b) — Socrates' reply to an imagined opponent who reproaches him for having led a life that brought him to a death sentence. Socrates' move: you "speak not well" (οὐ καλῶς λέγεις) if you suppose that a man "of even the smallest worth" (ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος) ought to weigh the risk of life or death (κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι). Life and death are struck out of the decision — that is DOGMAnot our business and not the criterion of an act.

The single question. In their place, one sole object of consideration (ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν): "whether I act justly or unjustly, and whether this is the work of a good man or a bad" (πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικαἀγαθοῦἔργαἢ κακοῦ). This is the Platonic source of the Stoic DOGMAself-sufficiency of virtue: the only variable of an act is its moral quality; survival is an indifferent. Marcus, for whom "to live or die" was a daily military and political reality, copies out of Socrates the very frame of his discipline of action. The direct continuation is 7.45 (the image of the post), and then 7.46 (the Gorgias: not to cling to length of life). Strictly: δίκαια/ἄδικα are adjectives, a theme, not the term δικαιοσύνη; the tag is withheld, the link kept to the commentary. The governing discipline is action; the sustaining one, assent.

DisciplineDiscipline of action
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished
Discipline of action

Original · ancient Greek

ʽἘγὼ δὲ τούτῳ δίκαιον ἂν λόγον ἀντείποιμι, ὅτι οὐ καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ ἄνθρωπε, εἰ οἴει δεῖν κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι ἄνδρα, ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν, ὅταν πράττῃ, πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικα πράττει καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ ‹ἔργα› ἢ κακοῦ

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Related3
Commentary

The core of the Plato series. A verbatim excerpt from the Apology (28b) — Socrates' reply to an imagined opponent who reproaches him for having led a life that brought him to a death sentence. Socrates' move: you "speak not well" (οὐ καλῶς λέγεις) if you suppose that a man "of even the smallest worth" (ὅτου τι καὶ σμικρὸν ὄφελος) ought to weigh the risk of life or death (κίνδυνον ὑπολογίζεσθαι τοῦ ζῆν ἢ τεθνάναι). Life and death are struck out of the decision — that is DOGMAnot our business and not the criterion of an act.

The single question. In their place, one sole object of consideration (ἐκεῖνο μόνον σκοπεῖν): "whether I act justly or unjustly, and whether this is the work of a good man or a bad" (πότερον δίκαια ἢ ἄδικαἀγαθοῦἔργαἢ κακοῦ). This is the Platonic source of the Stoic DOGMAself-sufficiency of virtue: the only variable of an act is its moral quality; survival is an indifferent. Marcus, for whom "to live or die" was a daily military and political reality, copies out of Socrates the very frame of his discipline of action. The direct continuation is 7.45 (the image of the post), and then 7.46 (the Gorgias: not to cling to length of life). Strictly: δίκαια/ἄδικα are adjectives, a theme, not the term δικαιοσύνη; the tag is withheld, the link kept to the commentary. The governing discipline is action; the sustaining one, assent.

DisciplineDiscipline of action
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished