The faculty that does not touch itself. The thesis: the TERMἡγεμονικόν "does not molest itself" — does not frighten itself, does not throw itself into TERMdesire. Let "someone else" try to frighten or grieve it (ποιείτω — "let him," with a shrug): of itself, "by way of judgment" (ὑποληπτικῶς), it will not turn itself into such "turns" (τροπάς). Fear, grief, desire are not invasions from outside but the soul's own swerves, performed by an act of judgment. This radicalizes 5.19: things do not touch the soul — it troubles itself.

The division of departments. The "poor little body" (σωμάτιον — a belittling diminutive) may see to it that it not suffer, "and let it say so if it suffers" — the body is granted a voice, but only about its own affairs. The "poor little soul" (ψυχάριον — the same diminutive as in 4.41, from Epictetus) — the agency that fears, grieves, and in general TERM"forms the judgment" (ὑπολαμβάνον) about all this — "will suffer nothing," for it will not dart (ᾄξει) into such a verdict. A continuation of 7.14's demarcation: the blow belongs to the body; harm comes only through the sentence.

The text. The passage is corrupt: after ἑαυτὸ the manuscripts have a gap (our source prints ‥), and the translators worked from supplemented editions — hence Long's "or cause itself pain" and Rogovin's «ни страха, ни сокрушения» (with no "desire"). Below, the variant ᾄξει/ἄξεις: our text is 3rd person ("the soul will not dart"; so Long — "it will never deviate"), while Rogovin read ἄξεις — "unless you force it." Doctrinally nothing hangs on it: the judgment is the soul's own act.

Autarky. The close: ἀπροσδεές — the ruling part "needs nothing, DOGMAso far as depends on itself (ὅσον ἐφ’ ἑαυτῷ), unless it makes a need for itself"; likewise ἀτάραχον καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον — untroubled and unhindered, "unless it troubles and hinders itself." The triple negation draws a closed circuit: everything that could hurt the ruling part passes through its own hands. The governing discipline is assent; the sustaining one, desire.