TERM

ἐπιθυμία

epithymia
RU

вожделение, страстное желание, влечение

EN

desire, appetite, craving

§ IDefinition

One of the four cardinal Stoic TERMπάθη (passions). In the Stoic matrix of passions along two axes ("good/evil" × "present/future"), ἐπιθυμία occupies the slot apparent good in the future: the soul judges "this (external) thing is a good that I ought to acquire" — and from this false evaluative assent arises an "irrational impulse" (ἄλογος ὄρεξις) toward the object. Chrysippus' formula (Stob. Ecl. II 90 W): ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶν ἄλογος ὄρεξις — "desire is an irrational impulse."

For the Stoics every form of obsessive wanting is a species of ἐπιθυμία: ἔρως (erotic love), σπάνις (longing for what one lacks), φιλοπλουτία (love of wealth), φιλοδοξία (love of glory), ὀργή (anger — "the desire for revenge"!), and so on. This typological move is principled: ἐπιθυμία for the Stoics is the generic class of partial directedness toward the not-yet-attained, not a "lower" wanting opposed to a "higher" one (as in Plato's Resp. IV).

The eupatheia-correlate (the sage's correct disposition occupying the same slot) is βούλησις — "rational wishing" — directed at what is truly good (virtue and what accords with it).

§ IISource

SVF III 391–442 (the doctrine of the passions); specifically on ἐπιθυμία: III 394–397, 412; DL VII 113; Stob. Ecl. II 88–93 W; Cic. Tusc. IV 11–14, 19–22; LS 65. In Marcus: Med. 2.10; 2.16; 05-28; 07-16 (the ἡγεμονικόν does not throw itself into ἐπιθυμία); 08-29 (in this soul — no ἐπιθυμία, no disturbance: now it is in my power); 9.7; 09-40 (the reform of prayer: ask not for the thing but not to ἐπιθυμεῖν it); 11.20.

§ IIINotes

In 02-10 ἐπιθυμία is opposed to TERMθυμός within the Theophrastean typology: offences born of desire are graver than offences born of anger. The Stoic nuance: strictly speaking, in Stoic doctrine even θυμός (anger) is itself a species of ἐπιθυμία (as is ὀργή — the desire to punish). Marcus here operates within the Peripatetic frame, in which ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are parallel categories. The Theophrastean argument turns on the "initiative" of the offence: desire issues from within, whereas anger is reactive (forced by an antecedent pain). This gives Marcus an ethical criterion of relative gravity: a voluntarily chosen offence is graver than a reactive one. See TERMhedone — the state under whose sway the ἐπιθυμία-offence is committed (ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἡττώμενος).

TERM

ἐπιθυμία

epithymia
RU

вожделение, страстное желание, влечение

EN

desire, appetite, craving

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Sections3

§ IDefinition

One of the four cardinal Stoic TERMπάθη (passions). In the Stoic matrix of passions along two axes ("good/evil" × "present/future"), ἐπιθυμία occupies the slot apparent good in the future: the soul judges "this (external) thing is a good that I ought to acquire" — and from this false evaluative assent arises an "irrational impulse" (ἄλογος ὄρεξις) toward the object. Chrysippus' formula (Stob. Ecl. II 90 W): ἐπιθυμία ἐστὶν ἄλογος ὄρεξις — "desire is an irrational impulse."

For the Stoics every form of obsessive wanting is a species of ἐπιθυμία: ἔρως (erotic love), σπάνις (longing for what one lacks), φιλοπλουτία (love of wealth), φιλοδοξία (love of glory), ὀργή (anger — "the desire for revenge"!), and so on. This typological move is principled: ἐπιθυμία for the Stoics is the generic class of partial directedness toward the not-yet-attained, not a "lower" wanting opposed to a "higher" one (as in Plato's Resp. IV).

The eupatheia-correlate (the sage's correct disposition occupying the same slot) is βούλησις — "rational wishing" — directed at what is truly good (virtue and what accords with it).

§ IISource

SVF III 391–442 (the doctrine of the passions); specifically on ἐπιθυμία: III 394–397, 412; DL VII 113; Stob. Ecl. II 88–93 W; Cic. Tusc. IV 11–14, 19–22; LS 65. In Marcus: Med. 2.10; 2.16; 05-28; 07-16 (the ἡγεμονικόν does not throw itself into ἐπιθυμία); 08-29 (in this soul — no ἐπιθυμία, no disturbance: now it is in my power); 9.7; 09-40 (the reform of prayer: ask not for the thing but not to ἐπιθυμεῖν it); 11.20.

§ IIINotes

In 02-10 ἐπιθυμία is opposed to TERMθυμός within the Theophrastean typology: offences born of desire are graver than offences born of anger. The Stoic nuance: strictly speaking, in Stoic doctrine even θυμός (anger) is itself a species of ἐπιθυμία (as is ὀργή — the desire to punish). Marcus here operates within the Peripatetic frame, in which ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are parallel categories. The Theophrastean argument turns on the "initiative" of the offence: desire issues from within, whereas anger is reactive (forced by an antecedent pain). This gives Marcus an ethical criterion of relative gravity: a voluntarily chosen offence is graver than a reactive one. See TERMhedone — the state under whose sway the ἐπιθυμία-offence is committed (ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἡττώμενος).

Related5
Appears in6
2.10Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts — such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind — says, like a true philosoph…3.7Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall compel thee to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to …7.16The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does not frighten itself or cause itself pain. But if any one else can frighten or pain it, let him do so. F…7.27Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what thou hast: but of the things which thou hast select the best, and then reflect how eagerly they would have be…8.29Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself: now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor desire nor any perturbation at all; but looki…9.40Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they have no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why dost thou not pray for t…
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