TERM

πάθος

pathos
RU

страсть, болезненное состояние души

EN

passion, the soul's pathological state

§ IDefinition

In Stoic technical usage, πάθος is not merely "emotion" but specifically an irrational emotion: "a movement of the soul that is contrary to nature and irrational" (Chrysippus, Stob. Ecl. II 88). A πάθος arises from the assent (συγκατάθεσις) given by the TERMruling part to a false evaluative TERMimpression — for example, to an impression "this [external good] is a real good" or "this [non-vice] is a real evil." The Stoics identify four cardinal πάθη along two axes (good/evil × present/future): ἐπιθυμία (desire — apparent good in the future), φόβος (fear — apparent evil in the future), ἡδονή (pleasure — apparent good in the present), λύπη (distress — apparent evil in the present). The ideal is TERMἀπάθεια — not insensibility, but freedom from false assents.

§ IISource

SVF III 377–490 (the large corpus on the πάθη — the principal Stoic psychological theory); classical formulations in DL VII 110–115; Stob. Ecl. II 88–93 W; Cic. Tusc. III–IV; LS 65. In Marcus: Med. 2.5; 2.10; 05-26 (add to the sensation no judgment of "good/bad"); 6.16; 8.29; 11.18.

§ IIINotes

In 02-05 πάθος appears in adjectival form as ἐμπαθής: «freed from … ἐμπαθοῦς ἀποστροφῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἱροῦντος λόγου» — "from passion-charmed turning-away from the governing reason." Passion is here defined by its structural effect: it tears the agent away from its own TERMreason. This is the typical Stoic formulation: πάθος is not "something added to reason" but reason's inner rift, the splitting of the self from itself. The therapy is not to suppress the emotion but to track the act of assent from which it is born (see the exercises prosochē and physical definition): a thing correctly described does not provoke passion.

TERM

πάθος

pathos
RU

страсть, болезненное состояние души

EN

passion, the soul's pathological state

Appears in9
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§ IDefinition

In Stoic technical usage, πάθος is not merely "emotion" but specifically an irrational emotion: "a movement of the soul that is contrary to nature and irrational" (Chrysippus, Stob. Ecl. II 88). A πάθος arises from the assent (συγκατάθεσις) given by the TERMruling part to a false evaluative TERMimpression — for example, to an impression "this [external good] is a real good" or "this [non-vice] is a real evil." The Stoics identify four cardinal πάθη along two axes (good/evil × present/future): ἐπιθυμία (desire — apparent good in the future), φόβος (fear — apparent evil in the future), ἡδονή (pleasure — apparent good in the present), λύπη (distress — apparent evil in the present). The ideal is TERMἀπάθεια — not insensibility, but freedom from false assents.

§ IISource

SVF III 377–490 (the large corpus on the πάθη — the principal Stoic psychological theory); classical formulations in DL VII 110–115; Stob. Ecl. II 88–93 W; Cic. Tusc. III–IV; LS 65. In Marcus: Med. 2.5; 2.10; 05-26 (add to the sensation no judgment of "good/bad"); 6.16; 8.29; 11.18.

§ IIINotes

In 02-05 πάθος appears in adjectival form as ἐμπαθής: «freed from … ἐμπαθοῦς ἀποστροφῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ αἱροῦντος λόγου» — "from passion-charmed turning-away from the governing reason." Passion is here defined by its structural effect: it tears the agent away from its own TERMreason. This is the typical Stoic formulation: πάθος is not "something added to reason" but reason's inner rift, the splitting of the self from itself. The therapy is not to suppress the emotion but to track the act of assent from which it is born (see the exercises prosochē and physical definition): a thing correctly described does not provoke passion.

Related4
Appears in9
1.1From my grandfather Verus I learned​ good morals and the government of my temper. (Long)2.5Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection, and freedom, and justic…2.10Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts — such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind — says, like a true philosoph…2.13Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says,​ and seeks by conjecture…3.2We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the things which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing and attractive. Fo…3.4Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others, when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility. For thou losest the opp…4.7Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the complaint, "I have been harmed." Take away the complaint, "I have been harmed," and the harm is taken aw…5.26Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be undisturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of pleasure or of pain; and let it not unite with them, b…9.40Either the gods have no power or they have power. If, then, they have no power, why dost thou pray to them? But if they have power, why dost thou not pray for t…
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