TERM

ἡδονή

hēdonē
RU

удовольствие, наслаждение

EN

pleasure

§ IDefinition

One of the four cardinal Stoic TERMπάθη. In the matrix of passions (good/evil × present/future), ἡδονή occupies the slot apparent good in the present: the soul judges "what I am experiencing now is a good for me" — and from this false assent arises an "irrational expansion" (ἄλογος ἔπαρσις) of the soul. Chrysippus' formula: ἡδονή ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις. This pneumatic physicalisation of emotion is typical of the Stoics — a passion is a concrete movement of the pneuma in the ruling part (an expansion or a contraction).

The Stoic position differs from, and stands in contrast to, the Epicurean: for Epicurus, ἡδονή is the telos, the final end that defines a successful life; for the Stoics, ἡδονή is a pathological state of false assent, the opposite of the smooth flow of life. The Stoics are not, however, ascetics: they distinguish ἡδονή (the passion) from χαρά — its eupatheia-correlate, the sage's "rational joy" at the genuine good, namely virtue. χαρά occasions no irrational expansion and is in concord with reason.

Species of ἡδονή: θέλξις (enchantment), ἀσμενισμός (self-satisfaction), ἐπιχαιρεκακία (malicious joy, Schadenfreude), τέρψις (sensuous delight), and so on.

§ IISource

SVF III 391–442; specifically on ἡδονή: III 414, 416, 421; DL VII 114–115; Stob. Ecl. II 90, 95 W; Cic. Tusc. IV 11–14, 19–20; LS 65. The Epicurean parallel: Epic. Ep. Men. 128–132. In Marcus: Med. 2.10; 05-09; 05-26; 06-34 (the greatest pleasures belong to the worst people: so not a good); 6.51; 7.55; 08-08 (to be above ἡδονή and πόνος is in your power); 08-10 (pleasure is neither useful nor good — the syllogism from repentance); 08-14 (opinions about ἡδονή/πόνος explain a man's acts); 08-39 (against ἡδονή the rational constitution has a counter-virtue — ἐγκράτεια); 08-41 (πόνος/ἡδονή touch you — "let sensation see to it," not reason); 09-01 (to pursue ἡδονή as a good and flee pain as an evil is impiety — a murmuring at the common nature); 9.7.

§ IIINotes

In 02-10 ἡδονή is the state under whose sway the agent acts in offences born of TERMdesire: «ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἡττώμενος» — "overcome by pleasure." This is the double argument of Theophrastus: (a) the offence itself is motivated by the pursuit of pleasure; (b) it is committed with pleasure. The comparison with TERMλύπη (with which the angry person commits his offence) yields a criterion: an offence committed "with pleasure" is worse than one committed "with grief," because pleasure marks inner assent to the bad, while grief marks resistance. This is a precise diagnostic inversion: the emotional background of an offence marks the degree of voluntariness.

TERM

ἡδονή

hēdonē
RU

удовольствие, наслаждение

EN

pleasure

Appears in19
Related4
Sections3

§ IDefinition

One of the four cardinal Stoic TERMπάθη. In the matrix of passions (good/evil × present/future), ἡδονή occupies the slot apparent good in the present: the soul judges "what I am experiencing now is a good for me" — and from this false assent arises an "irrational expansion" (ἄλογος ἔπαρσις) of the soul. Chrysippus' formula: ἡδονή ἐστιν ἄλογος ἔπαρσις. This pneumatic physicalisation of emotion is typical of the Stoics — a passion is a concrete movement of the pneuma in the ruling part (an expansion or a contraction).

The Stoic position differs from, and stands in contrast to, the Epicurean: for Epicurus, ἡδονή is the telos, the final end that defines a successful life; for the Stoics, ἡδονή is a pathological state of false assent, the opposite of the smooth flow of life. The Stoics are not, however, ascetics: they distinguish ἡδονή (the passion) from χαρά — its eupatheia-correlate, the sage's "rational joy" at the genuine good, namely virtue. χαρά occasions no irrational expansion and is in concord with reason.

Species of ἡδονή: θέλξις (enchantment), ἀσμενισμός (self-satisfaction), ἐπιχαιρεκακία (malicious joy, Schadenfreude), τέρψις (sensuous delight), and so on.

§ IISource

SVF III 391–442; specifically on ἡδονή: III 414, 416, 421; DL VII 114–115; Stob. Ecl. II 90, 95 W; Cic. Tusc. IV 11–14, 19–20; LS 65. The Epicurean parallel: Epic. Ep. Men. 128–132. In Marcus: Med. 2.10; 05-09; 05-26; 06-34 (the greatest pleasures belong to the worst people: so not a good); 6.51; 7.55; 08-08 (to be above ἡδονή and πόνος is in your power); 08-10 (pleasure is neither useful nor good — the syllogism from repentance); 08-14 (opinions about ἡδονή/πόνος explain a man's acts); 08-39 (against ἡδονή the rational constitution has a counter-virtue — ἐγκράτεια); 08-41 (πόνος/ἡδονή touch you — "let sensation see to it," not reason); 09-01 (to pursue ἡδονή as a good and flee pain as an evil is impiety — a murmuring at the common nature); 9.7.

§ IIINotes

In 02-10 ἡδονή is the state under whose sway the agent acts in offences born of TERMdesire: «ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἡττώμενος» — "overcome by pleasure." This is the double argument of Theophrastus: (a) the offence itself is motivated by the pursuit of pleasure; (b) it is committed with pleasure. The comparison with TERMλύπη (with which the angry person commits his offence) yields a criterion: an offence committed "with pleasure" is worse than one committed "with grief," because pleasure marks inner assent to the bad, while grief marks resistance. This is a precise diagnostic inversion: the emotional background of an offence marks the degree of voluntariness.

Related4
Appears in19
2.10Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts — such a comparison as one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind — says, like a true philosoph…2.12How quickly all things disappear, in the universe the bodies themselves, but in time the remembrance of them; what is the nature of all sensible things, and par…2.16The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the universe, so far as it can. For to be vexed a…2.17Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the whole body subject to putrefaction, and t…3.2We ought to observe also that even the things which follow after the things which are produced according to nature contain something pleasing and attractive. Fo…3.3Hippocrates after curing many diseases himself fell sick and died​. The Chaldaei​ foretold the deaths of many, and then fate caught them too. Alexander, and Pom…3.4Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about others, when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object of common utility. For thou losest the opp…3.6If thou findest in human life anything better than justice, truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better than thy own mind's self-satisfaction …4.3Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country, sea-shores, and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire such things very much. But this is altogethe…5.1In he morning when thou risest unwillingly, let this thought be present- I am rising to the work of a human being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to d…5.5Thou sayest, Men cannot admire the sharpness of thy wits.- Be it so: but there are many other things of which thou canst not say, I am not formed for them by na…5.9Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou dost not succeed in doing everything according to right principles; but when thou bast failed, retu…6.34How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers, patricides, tyrants. (Long)8.8Thou hast not leisure or ability to read. But thou hast leisure or ability to check arrogance: thou hast leisure to be superior to pleasure and pain: thou hast …8.10Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected something useful; but that which is good must be something useful, and the perfect good man should loo…8.14Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thyself: What opinions has this man about good and bad? For if with respect to pleasure and pain and the caus…8.39In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is opposed to love of pleasure, and that is tem…8.41Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the animal nature. Hindrance to the movements (desires) is equally an evil to the animal nature. And somethi…9.1He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the universal nature has made rational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their…
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