Justice has no opponent. A fine observation from "the constitution of the rational animal" (ἡ τοῦ λογικοῦ ζῴου κατασκευή): in it there is no TERMvirtue "rising up against" (κατεξαναστατική) TERMjustice. In other words, justice needs no curber: it is not a passion to be reined in but the very orientation of rational nature toward the common. No built-in power pulls the rational being away from justice as from something excessive.

Pleasure has one. The asymmetry: against TERMpleasure (ἡδονή) such a counter-virtue does exist — "self-control" (ἐγκράτεια). This means that ἡδονή by its nature can draw one past the mark, and so requires a special restraining power; justice does not, for one cannot strive "too much" toward the common good. The conclusion fits the Stoic hierarchy: pleasure is no good (8.10), and the rational constitution is furnished with a defence against it precisely, not against virtue. The strict terms by the word are δικαιοσύνη, ἀρετή, ἡδονή; ἐγκράτεια is uncarded (not established in the corpus). The governing discipline is desire (self-control against pleasure), the sustaining one action (justice toward the common).