A syllogism against pleasure. The passage is a small formal proof that TERMpleasure (ἡδονή) is not a TERMgood. The premises: (1) repentance (μετάνοια) is "self-reproof" for having let slip the useful (χρήσιμον); (2) the useful must be some good (ἀγαθόν) that the "fine and good man" (ὁ καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός — the Stoic ideal of kalokagathia) attends to; (3) but such a man will never repent of having let a pleasure slip. Conclusion: pleasure is "neither useful nor good."

What is proved here. The argument from the absence of repentance: the mark of a non-good is that the sage does not regret its loss. No virtuous person reproaches himself for a missed pleasure — so pleasure falls outside the class of goods, i.e. is indifferent (a "preferred" one at best). The DOGMAsufficiency of virtue is thereby defended against hedonism: a good is only that whose loss is a genuine harm, and only the virtuous is such (cf. 6.34 — scoundrels too revel in pleasures, so pleasure is no good). The strict terms by the word are ἡδονή and ἀγαθόν. The governing discipline is desire (the revaluation of pleasure), the sustaining one assent (not to judge ἡδονή a good).