A syllogism against pleasure. The passage is a small formal proof that TERMpleasure (ἡδονή) is not a TERMgood. The premises: (1) repentance (μετάνοια) is "self-reproof" for having let slip the useful (χρήσιμον); (2) the useful must be some good (ἀγαθόν) that the "fine and good man" (καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ — the Greek ideal of kalokagathia) attends to; (3) but such a man will never repent of having let a pleasure slip. Conclusion: pleasure is "neither useful nor good."

What is proved here. The argument from the absence of repentance: the mark of a non-good is that the sage does not regret its loss. No virtuous person reproaches himself for a missed pleasure — so pleasure falls outside the class of goods, i.e. is indifferent. The DOGMAsufficiency of virtue is thereby defended against hedonism: a good is only that whose loss is a genuine harm, and only the virtuous is such (cf. 6.34 — scoundrels too revel in pleasures, so pleasure is no good). The governing discipline is desire (the revaluation of pleasure), the sustaining one assent (not to judge ἡδονή a good).