The morning rising — a second version. The passage echoes 5.1 ("at dawn say to yourself: I rise to do a human's work"), but builds its argument differently — from the nature of the agent. The reluctance to rise (ἐξ ὕπνου δυσχερῶς) is dissolved by a reminder (ἀναμιμνῄσκου): "to render TERMsocial acts" (πράξεις κοινωνικὰς ἀποδιδόναι) is according to your "constitution" (κατασκευή) and TERMhuman nature; whereas sleeping is "common also to the irrational animals" (κοινὸν καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων). The choice between sleep and work is cast as a choice between the animal and the human in oneself.

One's own, kindred, agreeable. The conclusion is a fine Stoic move: DOGMA"what accords with each one's nature" (ὃ κατὰ φύσιν ἑκάστῳ) is for it "DOGMAmore its own (οἰκειότερον), more kindred (προσφυέστερον), and indeed more agreeable (προσηνέστερον)." Against the hedonist's objection ("but sleeping is pleasanter!") stands a revaluation of the pleasant: what is truly "agreeable" is not relaxation but activity according to one's nature — the same logic as 8.10 (pleasure is no good). The root οἰκει- directly introduces DOGMAοἰκείωσις: social action is not an external duty but what is most one's "own." The strict terms by the word are φύσις and κοινωνικός. The governing discipline is action (to rise and do the common work), the sustaining one desire (the revaluation of "the pleasant").