A change of mind as freedom. Against stubbornness masquerading as firmness. Marcus equates in freedom two moves: "to change one's opinion" (μετατίθεσθαι) following the one who corrects (τῷ διορθοῦντι) — and "to persist." Both are equally free (ὁμοίως ἐλεύθερον), for both are your own activity (σὴ ἐνέργεια). To yield to a right argument is not a defeat of the will but its act: cf. 6.21 — "if anyone can prove to me that I think or act wrongly, I will gladly change."

Why it is one's own. The act is carried through (περαινομένη) "according to your TERMimpulse (ὁρμή), judgment (κρίσις), and TERMmind (νοῦς)" — the threefold sequence of an act's generation within the DOGMAruling part. Since a change of mind issues from these same faculties of one's own, it is no less "mine" than persistence; the truth is received by the very mind that erred before. Rogovin compresses the Greek triad (ὁρμή/κρίσις/νοῦς) to "according to your own reason." The strict terms by the word are ὁρμή and νοῦς (νοῦν, accusative of νοῦς). The governing discipline is assent (the free revision of a judgment).