A change of mind as freedom. Against stubbornness masquerading as firmness. Marcus says that "to change one's opinion" (μετατίθεσθαι) and to follow the one who corrects (ἕπεσθαι τῷ διορθοῦντι) is "equally free" (ὁμοίως ἐλεύθερον); the term of comparison is left unstated, and Long supplies it: "as it is to persist in thy error." A change of mind is free because it is your own activity (σὴ ἐνέργεια). To yield to a right argument is not a defeat of the will but its act: cf. 6.21 — "If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do not think or act right, I will gladly change."

Why it is one's own. The act is carried through (περαινομένη) "according to your TERMimpulse (ὁρμή), judgment (κρίσις), and TERMmind (νοῦς)" — the threefold sequence of an act's generation within the DOGMAruling part. Since a change of mind issues from these same faculties of one's own, it is no less "mine" than persistence; the truth is received by the very mind that erred before. Rogovin compresses the Greek triad (ὁρμή/κρίσις/νοῦς) to "according to your own reason." The governing discipline is assent (the free revision of a judgment).