He who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the TERMuniversal nature has made DOGMArational animals for the sake of one another to help one another according to their deserts, but in no way to injure one another, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of impiety towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is guilty of impiety to the same divinity; for the universal nature is the nature of things that are; and things that are have a relation to all things that come into existence. And further, this universal nature is named truth, and is the prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts unjustly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally, inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the nature of the world; for he fights against it, who is moved of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he had received powers from nature through the neglect of which he is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And indeed he who pursues TERMpleasure as good, and avoids pain as evil, is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoyment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleasure, but the good have pain for their share and the things which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things towards which the universal nature is equally affected- for it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected towards both- towards these DOGMAthey who wish to follow nature should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected. With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or honour and dishonour, which the universal nature employs equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly acting impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to those who are produced in continuous series and to those who come after them by virtue of a certain original movement of DOGMAProvidence, according to which it moved from a certain beginning to this ordering of things, MOTIFhaving conceived certain principles of the things which were to be, and having determined powers productive of beings and of changes and of such like successions.

Whoever acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the TERMnature of the Whole has framed DOGMArational beings for one another's sake — to benefit one another according to desert, and in no way to harm — whoever transgresses her will is plainly impious toward the eldest of the gods. And the liar too is impious toward the same divinity; for the nature of the Whole is the nature of the things that are, and the things that are are akin to all that exists. And this nature is called truth, and is the first cause of all that is true. So the deliberate liar is impious, in that by deceiving he acts unjustly; and the unwitting liar too, in that he is out of tune with the nature of the Whole and, fighting the nature of the world, throws its order into disarray — for he fights it who is carried, against himself, toward what is contrary to the truth: he had received from nature the starting-points which, having neglected, he is now unable to tell the false from the true. And indeed whoever pursues TERMpleasures as goods and flees pains as evils is impious; for such a man must often blame the common nature for assigning to the bad and the good contrary to their desert, since often the bad are amid pleasures and possess the means to them, while the good meet with pain and its causes. And again, one who fears pains will sometimes fear something that is to be in the world — and this is already impiety; and one who pursues pleasures will not hold back from injustice — and this is plainly impiety. Toward the things the common nature is equally disposed to (it would not have made both, were it not equally disposed to both), DOGMAthose who wish to follow nature, being of one mind with it, should likewise be equally disposed. So whoever, toward pain and pleasure, or death and life, or fame and dishonour — which the nature of the Whole uses equally — is himself not equally disposed, is plainly impious. And when I say the common nature uses these equally, I mean that they befall equally, in due sequence, what comes to be and what follows after, by a certain original impulse of DOGMAProvidence, by which it set out from some beginning to this ordering, MOTIFhaving conceived certain principles of what was to be, and marked off generative powers of substances and of changes and of successions of the like.