Drawing the boundary. The passage runs a demarcation line inside the person: let the external "fall" (προσπιπτέτω — a verb of impact, carrying on πρόσπτωσις, the "falling-upon") on what is able to suffer — the flesh, the sentient parts. "What has suffered will complain, if it chooses" (μέμψεται τὰ παθόντα) — an almost juridical irony: only the party that sustained the damage has standing to sue. The "I" — the ruling part — is not a party to that suit: cf. 05-26 (do not resist the sensation, but let the ruling part add no TERMopinion of "good/bad") and 06-32 (to the body what is bodily; to the mind its own).

οὔπω βέβλαμμαι — "not yet injured." The logic is familiar from 4.7: ἆρον τὴν ὑπόληψιν, ἦρται τὸ βέβλαμμαι — "remove the opinion, and 'I have been harmed' is removed." An external blow becomes my harm only through my TERMὑπόληψις that "what happened is an evil"; without that signature the instrument is void. The exact parallels are 8.40 ("it is not the thing that torments you but your judgment about it") and Epict. Ench. 5 (not things disturb us, but opinions about things). The adverb οὔπω ("not yet") honestly keeps the door open: harm is possible — but only as my own manufacture.

The final footing. The close is pure DOGMAdichotomy: ἔξεστι δέ μοι μὴ ὑπολαβεῖν — "and it is in my power not to take it so." The whole construction rests on this ἔξεστί μοι: the demarcation would be useless if the judgment were wrung from us automatically. The governing discipline is assent (the work on ὑπόληψις); the sustaining one, desire (tranquillity before what comes from without).