Two rules and no third. Πρῶτον … δεύτερον — the entry is numbered, and the series stops at two. Short codes of this kind run in sequence through Book XII (12.8, 12.10, 12.18); here the numbering makes the break conspicuous, but nothing is missing: two rules are enough, because together they describe an action completely.

The first concerns form. μὴ εἰκῇ μηδὲ ἄνευ ἀναφορᾶς: not at random and not without a reference. Εἰκῇ is "haphazardly, without a plan"; ἀναφορά is "the referring," that to which an act is carried back. The same formula, almost word for word, stands in 4.2: μηδὲν ἐνέργημα εἰκῇ. So far the requirement is empty: we are told that there must be a reference, not what it is to.

The second concerns content. And here it is: ἐπὶ τὸ TERMκοινωνικὸν TERMτέλος, "to the social end," and to nothing else. With that the discipline of action closes: every act must be referred to something, and that something is the common good alone. Cf. 8.7 (a rational nature "directs its impulses to social works alone") and 9.6 (ἡ παροῦσα πρᾶξις κοινωνική).

Two words for one thing. In a single sentence stand ἀναφορά and ἀναγωγή — both mean "carrying back, referring," and Marcus changes the word deliberately, so that the rule should not look like a repetition of itself: the first demands that a reference exist, the second fixes its address. The governing discipline is action.