MED. 12.5Discipline of desire
George Long · 1862EN · Long

How can it be that DOGMAthe gods after having arranged all things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should never exist again, but should be completely extinguished? But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. For if it were TERMjust, it would also be possible; and if it were according to TERMnature, nature would have had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have been so:- for thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the deity; and we should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and TERMmost just;- but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and irrationally.

Original · ancient Greek

Πῶς ποτε πάντα καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως διατάξαντες οἱ θεοὶ τοῦτο μόνον παρεῖδον, τὸ ἐνίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάνυ χρηστοὺς καὶ πλεῖστα πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὥσπερ συμβόλαια θεμένους καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δι’ ἔργων ὁσίων καὶ ἱερουργιῶν συνήθεις τῷ θείῳ γενομένους, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ ἀποθάνωσι, μηκέτι αὖθις γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀπεσβηκέναι; τοῦτο δὲ εἴπερ ἄρα καὶ οὕτως ἔχει, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι, εἰ ὡς ἑτέρως ἔχειν ἔδει, ἐποίησαν ἄν· εἰ γὰρ δίκαιον ἦν, ἦν ἃν καὶ δυνατόν, καὶ εἰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἤνεγκεν ἂν αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις. ἐκ δὴ τοῦ μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν, εἴπερ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, πιστούσθω σοι τὸ μὴ δεῆσαι οὕτως γίνεσθαι· ὁρᾷς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι τοῦτο παραζητῶν δικαιολογῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν· οὐκ ἂν δ’ οὕτως διελεγόμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰ μὴ ἄριστοι καὶ δικαιότατοί εἰσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἄν τι περιεῖδον ἀδίκως καὶ ἀλόγως ἠμελημένον τῶν ἐν τῇ διακοσμήσει.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

An objection written out at full strength. The passage is unusual in that Marcus sets down the argument against providence entire and unabridged: the gods ordered everything καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως — and "overlooked this one thing alone." This is the school form of an ἀπορία: first the objection in its strongest version, then the examination. Usually in the Meditations the opponent's case is compressed into half a line; here it is given half the entry.

The example is chosen to sting. It is not about himself, nor about people in general, but about the "thoroughly good" (πάνυ χρηστούς) — those who had as it were entered into συμβόλαια with the divine. The word is commercial: contracts, engagements, the things concluded in a market and in a court. And further: through ἔργα ὅσια and ἱερουργίαι they became συνήθεις τῷ θείῳ, "on familiar terms with the divine," habituated to one another. The metaphor is almost impudent — piety described as a long business relationship, and the end of it put in the verb ἀπεσβηκέναι, "to have been snuffed out entirely." The same verb stands in the disjunction of 5.33: σβέσις ἢ μετάστασις, "extinction or transposition."

The first answer: from fact to obligation. The argument is split in two: if it were TERMjust, it would also be possible; if it were according to TERMnature, nature would have brought it about. Hence the reverse inference: since it is not so, it ought not to have been so. The move is vulnerable — it derives the ought from the is — and Marcus seems to feel it: twice a cautious εἴπερ is inserted, "if indeed that is how it is." Nowhere does he assert that there is no immortality; he reasons on the supposition that there is none.

The second answer, and it is the stronger. ὁρᾷς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι τοῦτο παραζητῶν δικαιολογῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. Δικαιολογέομαι is a courtroom verb: "to plead a case, to argue one's right at law." And then: we would not argue with the gods like this unless they were the best and the most just. The objection is overturned by the very fact of its being brought: a suit about injustice makes sense only where there is a just judge — and in presupposing the judge you have already granted what you are contesting. The argument does not answer the question about the afterlife; it shows that the form of the complaint itself is a confession of providence.

What Marcus does not do. He neither proves immortality nor denies it — the question is left open, as in 5.33, where "extinction or transposition" are awaited with equal calm; cf. the disjunction of 12.14 in this same book, and 10.6. The governing discipline is desire (consent to the ordering of the whole), the sustaining one assent: the whole passage is work upon an argument.

DisciplineDiscipline of desire
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished
Discipline of desire

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

How can it be that DOGMAthe gods after having arranged all things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked this alone, that some men and very good men, and men who, as we may say, have had most communion with the divinity, and through pious acts and religious observances have been most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died should never exist again, but should be completely extinguished? But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been otherwise, the gods would have done it. For if it were TERMjust, it would also be possible; and if it were according to TERMnature, nature would have had it so. But because it is not so, if in fact it is not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have been so:- for thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry thou art disputing with the deity; and we should not thus dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and TERMmost just;- but if this is so, they would not have allowed anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected unjustly and irrationally.

Original · ancient Greek

Πῶς ποτε πάντα καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως διατάξαντες οἱ θεοὶ τοῦτο μόνον παρεῖδον, τὸ ἐνίους τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάνυ χρηστοὺς καὶ πλεῖστα πρὸς τὸ θεῖον ὥσπερ συμβόλαια θεμένους καὶ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον δι’ ἔργων ὁσίων καὶ ἱερουργιῶν συνήθεις τῷ θείῳ γενομένους, ἐπειδὰν ἅπαξ ἀποθάνωσι, μηκέτι αὖθις γίνεσθαι, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὸ παντελὲς ἀπεσβηκέναι; τοῦτο δὲ εἴπερ ἄρα καὶ οὕτως ἔχει, εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι, εἰ ὡς ἑτέρως ἔχειν ἔδει, ἐποίησαν ἄν· εἰ γὰρ δίκαιον ἦν, ἦν ἃν καὶ δυνατόν, καὶ εἰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἤνεγκεν ἂν αὐτὸ ἡ φύσις. ἐκ δὴ τοῦ μὴ οὕτως ἔχειν, εἴπερ οὐχ οὕτως ἔχει, πιστούσθω σοι τὸ μὴ δεῆσαι οὕτως γίνεσθαι· ὁρᾷς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι τοῦτο παραζητῶν δικαιολογῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν· οὐκ ἂν δ’ οὕτως διελεγόμεθα τοῖς θεοῖς, εἰ μὴ ἄριστοι καὶ δικαιότατοί εἰσιν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐκ ἄν τι περιεῖδον ἀδίκως καὶ ἀλόγως ἠμελημένον τῶν ἐν τῇ διακοσμήσει.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Related3
Commentary

An objection written out at full strength. The passage is unusual in that Marcus sets down the argument against providence entire and unabridged: the gods ordered everything καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως — and "overlooked this one thing alone." This is the school form of an ἀπορία: first the objection in its strongest version, then the examination. Usually in the Meditations the opponent's case is compressed into half a line; here it is given half the entry.

The example is chosen to sting. It is not about himself, nor about people in general, but about the "thoroughly good" (πάνυ χρηστούς) — those who had as it were entered into συμβόλαια with the divine. The word is commercial: contracts, engagements, the things concluded in a market and in a court. And further: through ἔργα ὅσια and ἱερουργίαι they became συνήθεις τῷ θείῳ, "on familiar terms with the divine," habituated to one another. The metaphor is almost impudent — piety described as a long business relationship, and the end of it put in the verb ἀπεσβηκέναι, "to have been snuffed out entirely." The same verb stands in the disjunction of 5.33: σβέσις ἢ μετάστασις, "extinction or transposition."

The first answer: from fact to obligation. The argument is split in two: if it were TERMjust, it would also be possible; if it were according to TERMnature, nature would have brought it about. Hence the reverse inference: since it is not so, it ought not to have been so. The move is vulnerable — it derives the ought from the is — and Marcus seems to feel it: twice a cautious εἴπερ is inserted, "if indeed that is how it is." Nowhere does he assert that there is no immortality; he reasons on the supposition that there is none.

The second answer, and it is the stronger. ὁρᾷς γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸς ὅτι τοῦτο παραζητῶν δικαιολογῇ πρὸς τὸν θεόν. Δικαιολογέομαι is a courtroom verb: "to plead a case, to argue one's right at law." And then: we would not argue with the gods like this unless they were the best and the most just. The objection is overturned by the very fact of its being brought: a suit about injustice makes sense only where there is a just judge — and in presupposing the judge you have already granted what you are contesting. The argument does not answer the question about the afterlife; it shows that the form of the complaint itself is a confession of providence.

What Marcus does not do. He neither proves immortality nor denies it — the question is left open, as in 5.33, where "extinction or transposition" are awaited with equal calm; cf. the disjunction of 12.14 in this same book, and 10.6. The governing discipline is desire (consent to the ordering of the whole), the sustaining one assent: the whole passage is work upon an argument.

DisciplineDiscipline of desire
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished