MED. 12.4Discipline of assent
George Long · 1862EN · Long

I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own TERMopinion of himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher should present himself to a man and bid him EXERCISEto think of nothing and to design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he could not endure it even for a single day. So much more TERMrespect have we to DOGMAwhat our neighbours shall think of us than to what we shall think of ourselves.

Original · ancient Greek

Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα πῶς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἕκαστος μᾶλλον πάντων φιλεῖ, τὴν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ αὑτοῦ ὑπόληψιν ἐν ἐλάττονι λόγῳ τίθεται ἢ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων. ἐὰν γοῦν τινα θεὸς ἐπιστὰς ἢ διδάσκαλος ἔμφρων κελεύσῃ μηδὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι ὃ μὴ ἄμα καὶ γεγωνίσκων ἐξοίσει, οὐδὲ πρὸς μίαν ἡμέραν τοῦτο ὑπομενεῖ. οὕτως τοὺς πέλας μᾶλλον αἰδούμεθα, τί ποτε περὶ ἡμῶν φρονήσουσιν, ἢ ἑαυτούς.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

The register of an observer. Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα — "I have often wondered." The passage opens not with an order to oneself but with the statement of an oddity; for the Meditations this is a rare tone — the tone of an observer of manners, nearer to a writer of characters than to a teacher. The imperatives return only in the following entries, 12.6 and after.

The contradiction the whole thing rests on. A man φιλεῖ himself more than anyone — and yet sets his own TERMopinion of himself ἐν ἐλάττονι λόγῳ, "at a lower reckoning," than other people's. The phrase ἐν λόγῳ τίθεσθαι ("to put to account, to value") stands in 3.4 as well, in a kindred use: the good man "does not put to account the praise of such men, who are not even pleasing to themselves." Here the same phrase is turned inward: self-love and self-distrust live together in one man — and he does not see the contradiction.

The test of speaking aloud. The thought-experiment: a god, or a teacher with sense, orders him to think nothing that he would not shout out on the spotγεγωνίσκων, from γέγωνα, "to call so as to be heard at a distance." The verdict is brief: οὐδὲ πρὸς μίαν ἡμέραν, "he would not last a single day." The same test, taken from the positive end, is set in 3.4: train yourself to entertain only what you could answer μετὰ παρρησίας, without flinching, if someone suddenly asked "what are you thinking now?" There it measures an attainment, here a general failure; the test is one and the same.

The word the conclusion rests on. τοὺς πέλας μᾶλλον αἰδούμεθαἢ ἑαυτούς. TERMΑἰδώς is shame-as-reverence, the feeling by which a man reckons with another's gaze; for the Stoics it is a valuable thing, the companion of conscience. Marcus points not at its absence but at its wrong address: it is spent entirely on the neighbours, and none of it is kept for oneself. Hence the practical move he makes elsewhere: if another's gaze weighs so much, look at whose gaze it is — 7.62 ("what ruling parts those men have whose testimony you are after") and 9.18. And hence too the simplest remedy, 4.18: how much leisure a man gains who does not look at what his neighbour said or did at all.

The link with the neighbouring entry. In 12.3 assent was just defined through speech — "saying what is true." Here speech becomes the touchstone of thought: a thought is sound exactly so far as it can be spoken. The governing discipline is assent, the sustaining one desire.

DisciplineDiscipline of assent
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished
Discipline of assent

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

I have often wondered how it is that every man loves himself more than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value on his own TERMopinion of himself than on the opinion of others. If then a god or a wise teacher should present himself to a man and bid him EXERCISEto think of nothing and to design nothing which he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he could not endure it even for a single day. So much more TERMrespect have we to DOGMAwhat our neighbours shall think of us than to what we shall think of ourselves.

Original · ancient Greek

Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα πῶς ἑαυτὸν μὲν ἕκαστος μᾶλλον πάντων φιλεῖ, τὴν δὲ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ αὑτοῦ ὑπόληψιν ἐν ἐλάττονι λόγῳ τίθεται ἢ τὴν τῶν ἄλλων. ἐὰν γοῦν τινα θεὸς ἐπιστὰς ἢ διδάσκαλος ἔμφρων κελεύσῃ μηδὲν καθ’ ἑαυτὸν ἐνθυμεῖσθαι καὶ διανοεῖσθαι ὃ μὴ ἄμα καὶ γεγωνίσκων ἐξοίσει, οὐδὲ πρὸς μίαν ἡμέραν τοῦτο ὑπομενεῖ. οὕτως τοὺς πέλας μᾶλλον αἰδούμεθα, τί ποτε περὶ ἡμῶν φρονήσουσιν, ἢ ἑαυτούς.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Related4
Commentary

The register of an observer. Πολλάκις ἐθαύμασα — "I have often wondered." The passage opens not with an order to oneself but with the statement of an oddity; for the Meditations this is a rare tone — the tone of an observer of manners, nearer to a writer of characters than to a teacher. The imperatives return only in the following entries, 12.6 and after.

The contradiction the whole thing rests on. A man φιλεῖ himself more than anyone — and yet sets his own TERMopinion of himself ἐν ἐλάττονι λόγῳ, "at a lower reckoning," than other people's. The phrase ἐν λόγῳ τίθεσθαι ("to put to account, to value") stands in 3.4 as well, in a kindred use: the good man "does not put to account the praise of such men, who are not even pleasing to themselves." Here the same phrase is turned inward: self-love and self-distrust live together in one man — and he does not see the contradiction.

The test of speaking aloud. The thought-experiment: a god, or a teacher with sense, orders him to think nothing that he would not shout out on the spotγεγωνίσκων, from γέγωνα, "to call so as to be heard at a distance." The verdict is brief: οὐδὲ πρὸς μίαν ἡμέραν, "he would not last a single day." The same test, taken from the positive end, is set in 3.4: train yourself to entertain only what you could answer μετὰ παρρησίας, without flinching, if someone suddenly asked "what are you thinking now?" There it measures an attainment, here a general failure; the test is one and the same.

The word the conclusion rests on. τοὺς πέλας μᾶλλον αἰδούμεθαἢ ἑαυτούς. TERMΑἰδώς is shame-as-reverence, the feeling by which a man reckons with another's gaze; for the Stoics it is a valuable thing, the companion of conscience. Marcus points not at its absence but at its wrong address: it is spent entirely on the neighbours, and none of it is kept for oneself. Hence the practical move he makes elsewhere: if another's gaze weighs so much, look at whose gaze it is — 7.62 ("what ruling parts those men have whose testimony you are after") and 9.18. And hence too the simplest remedy, 4.18: how much leisure a man gains who does not look at what his neighbour said or did at all.

The link with the neighbouring entry. In 12.3 assent was just defined through speech — "saying what is true." Here speech becomes the touchstone of thought: a thought is sound exactly so far as it can be spoken. The governing discipline is assent, the sustaining one desire.

DisciplineDiscipline of assent
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished