MED. 11.21Discipline of action
George Long · 1862EN · Long

"He who has not one and always the same TERMobject in life, MOTIFcannot be one and the same all through his life."1 But what I have said is not enough, unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there is not the same TERMopinion about all the things which in some way or other are considered by the majority to be TERMgood, but only about some certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a TERMcommon kind DOGMAand political. For he who directs all his own TERMefforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the same.

Original · ancient Greek

ʽὯι μὴ εἶς καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βίου σκοπός, οὗτος εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δι’ ὅλου τοῦ βίου εἶναι οὐ δύναται1 οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον, ἐὰν μὴ κἀκεῖνο προσθῇς, ὁποῖον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν σκοπόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐχ ἡ πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν τοῖς πλείοσι δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν ὑπόληψις ὁμοία ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν τοιῶνδέ τινων, τουτέστι τῶν κοινῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν δεῖ τὸν κοινωνικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑποστήσασθαι. ὁ γὰρ εἰς τοῦτον πάσας τὰς ἰδίας ὁρμὰς ἀπευθύνων πάσας τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας ἀποδώσει καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

A quotation that does not suffice. The passage opens with someone else's formula in quotation marks1 and immediately limits it: οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον — "what has been said is not enough." This is a rare genre in Marcus: neither assent nor dispute, but further specification. The borrowed thought is true but empty: it demands a single aim without saying which.

Self-identity as a function of the aim. MOTIFὯι μὴ MOTIFεἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτόςMOTIFσκοπός, οὗτος MOTIFεἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸςMOTIFεἶναι οὐ δύναται — one and the same formula is spoken twice: first of the aim, then of the person. The unity of a personality is not given but derivative: as many aims, so many selves. Hence the link with MOTIFaimless wandering — in Marcus this is not absent-mindedness but a coming-apart into several "I"s.

An argument by analogy with opinion about the good. The analogy is built on TERMὑπόληψις: not every opinion about what the majority take to be TERMgood is uniform — the common ones (τὰ κοινά) are singled out from the mass. So too with the aim: not any will do, but one of the same kind. The logic is this: the aim must belong to the class about which non-conflicting agreement is possible — and only the common interest is such.

The conclusion in one word. τὸν σκοπὸντὸν TERMκοινωνικὸν DOGMAκαὶ πολιτικὸν DOGMAὑποστήσασθαι — "the aim must be set underneath oneself" (ὑφίστημι, "to lay as a foundation"). Not chosen, nor set before one, but laid under everything as a footing. And the mechanism: πάσας τὰς ἰδίας TERMὁρμὰς ἀπευθύνων — "straightening all his own private impulses toward it" (ἀπευθύνω, to true up along a line, as a beam is trued). The result: πάσας τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας ἀποδώσει — all his acts will come out of one kind, and thereby ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται.

Why this is the discipline of action. What is at issue is not how to judge what happens but what the whole body of one's acts is fastened to. Cf. 7.4 (at every impulse, to what mark is it referred) and 9.23 (an act with no reference to the common end "tears apart" one's life and proves seditious). The governing discipline is action, the sustaining one assent.

DisciplineDiscipline of action
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished
Discipline of action

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

"He who has not one and always the same TERMobject in life, MOTIFcannot be one and the same all through his life."1 But what I have said is not enough, unless this also is added, what this object ought to be. For as there is not the same TERMopinion about all the things which in some way or other are considered by the majority to be TERMgood, but only about some certain things, that is, things which concern the common interest, so also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall be of a TERMcommon kind DOGMAand political. For he who directs all his own TERMefforts to this object, will make all his acts alike, and thus will always be the same.

Original · ancient Greek

ʽὯι μὴ εἶς καὶ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ἀεὶ τοῦ βίου σκοπός, οὗτος εἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς δι’ ὅλου τοῦ βίου εἶναι οὐ δύναται1 οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον, ἐὰν μὴ κἀκεῖνο προσθῇς, ὁποῖον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν σκοπόν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐχ ἡ πάντων τῶν ὁπωσοῦν τοῖς πλείοσι δοκούντων ἀγαθῶν ὑπόληψις ὁμοία ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ ἡ τῶν τοιῶνδέ τινων, τουτέστι τῶν κοινῶν, οὕτω καὶ τὸν σκοπὸν δεῖ τὸν κοινωνικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ὑποστήσασθαι. ὁ γὰρ εἰς τοῦτον πάσας τὰς ἰδίας ὁρμὰς ἀπευθύνων πάσας τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας ἀποδώσει καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Marginalia1
Related7
Commentary

A quotation that does not suffice. The passage opens with someone else's formula in quotation marks1 and immediately limits it: οὐκ ἀρκεῖ τὸ εἰρημένον — "what has been said is not enough." This is a rare genre in Marcus: neither assent nor dispute, but further specification. The borrowed thought is true but empty: it demands a single aim without saying which.

Self-identity as a function of the aim. MOTIFὯι μὴ MOTIFεἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτόςMOTIFσκοπός, οὗτος MOTIFεἷς καὶ ὁ αὐτὸςMOTIFεἶναι οὐ δύναται — one and the same formula is spoken twice: first of the aim, then of the person. The unity of a personality is not given but derivative: as many aims, so many selves. Hence the link with MOTIFaimless wandering — in Marcus this is not absent-mindedness but a coming-apart into several "I"s.

An argument by analogy with opinion about the good. The analogy is built on TERMὑπόληψις: not every opinion about what the majority take to be TERMgood is uniform — the common ones (τὰ κοινά) are singled out from the mass. So too with the aim: not any will do, but one of the same kind. The logic is this: the aim must belong to the class about which non-conflicting agreement is possible — and only the common interest is such.

The conclusion in one word. τὸν σκοπὸντὸν TERMκοινωνικὸν DOGMAκαὶ πολιτικὸν DOGMAὑποστήσασθαι — "the aim must be set underneath oneself" (ὑφίστημι, "to lay as a foundation"). Not chosen, nor set before one, but laid under everything as a footing. And the mechanism: πάσας τὰς ἰδίας TERMὁρμὰς ἀπευθύνων — "straightening all his own private impulses toward it" (ἀπευθύνω, to true up along a line, as a beam is trued). The result: πάσας τὰς πράξεις ὁμοίας ἀποδώσει — all his acts will come out of one kind, and thereby ἀεὶ ὁ αὐτὸς ἔσται.

Why this is the discipline of action. What is at issue is not how to judge what happens but what the whole body of one's acts is fastened to. Cf. 7.4 (at every impulse, to what mark is it referred) and 9.23 (an act with no reference to the common end "tears apart" one's life and proves seditious). The governing discipline is action, the sustaining one assent.

DisciplineDiscipline of action
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished