MED. 10.3Discipline of desire
George Long · 1862EN · Long

Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art TERMformed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not TERMformed by nature to bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature to bear everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own TERMopinion DOGMAto make it endurable and tolerable, by TERMthinking that it is either thy interest or thy TERMduty to do this.

Original · ancient Greek

Πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον ἤτοι οὕτω συμβαίνει ὡς πέφυκας αὐτὸ φέρειν ἢ ὡς οὐ πέφυκας αὐτὸ φέρειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίνει σοι ὡς πέφυκας φέρειν, μὴ δυσχέραινε, ἀλλ’ ὡς πέφυκας φέρε. εἰ δὲ ὡς μὴ πέφυκας φέρειν, μὴ δυσχέραινε· φθαρήσεται γάρ σε ἀπαναλῶσαν. μέμνησο μέντοι ὅτι πέφυκας φέρειν πᾶν, περὶ οὗ ἐπὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει ἐστὶ τῇ σῇ φορητὸν καὶ ἀνεκτὸν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι κατὰ φαντασίαν τοῦ συμφέρειν ἢ καθήκειν σεαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

A dilemma with no third term. The passage is built as an exhaustive disjunction of the same type as "providence or atoms" (9.39): everything that happens is either such as you are TERMby nature (πέφυκας) able to bear, or such as you are not. Both branches lead to the same place: μὴ δυσχέραινε, "do not be vexed." The first, because you can: bear it as you are constituted to bear. The second, because φθαρήσεται γάρ σε ἀπαναλῶσαν, "it will perish, having used you up": what exceeds your endurance will end together with you, and there is neither anyone nor any point in being vexed. The form of the argument is the school's "disarming dilemma."

And then the dilemma collapses. The second beat is μέμνησο μέντοι, "remember, however." The proviso cancels almost the whole second branch: you are by nature able to bear everything with respect to which DOGMAmaking it endurable and tolerable "lies with your own TERMopinion" (ἐπὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει ἐστὶ τῇ σῇ). The boundary of the bearable therefore runs not through the event but through the judgement. The second branch stays formally open — but is in fact nearly empty: almost everything that seems unbearable is unbearable by ὑπόληψις, not by nature (cf. 5.18; 4.7; 8.47).

By what the judgement makes it bearable. The mechanism is named exactly: κατὰ TERMφαντασίαν τοῦ συμφέρειν ἢ TERMκαθήκειν — "on the impression that this is advantageous, or that it is fitting." Two motives, and of different kinds: συμφέρον is the reckoning of benefit, καθῆκον the technical Stoic "appropriate," the act that suits one's nature and role. Marcus offers both without choosing: to make the unbearable bearable it is enough to see in it either a use or a duty. The governing discipline is desire (the acceptance of what happens), the sustaining one assent (the work upon ὑπόληψις).

Textual note. φθαρήσεται ("will be destroyed," from φθείρω) is printed here; part of the tradition gives φθήσεται (from φθάνω — "will be gone first"). The sense is the same either way and agrees with both translations: Long, "it will perish after it has consumed thee"; Rogovin, «уничтожив тебя, оно погибнет и само». Further, the stub carried a full stop after ὡς πέφυκας φέρειν, which broke the conditional period; the comma has been restored on the authority of the Greek source and of both translations.

DisciplineDiscipline of desire
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished
Discipline of desire

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

Everything which happens either happens in such wise as thou art TERMformed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not TERMformed by nature to bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in such way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it. But if it happens in such wise as thou art not formed by nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art formed by nature to bear everything, with respect to which it depends on thy own TERMopinion DOGMAto make it endurable and tolerable, by TERMthinking that it is either thy interest or thy TERMduty to do this.

Original · ancient Greek

Πᾶν τὸ συμβαῖνον ἤτοι οὕτω συμβαίνει ὡς πέφυκας αὐτὸ φέρειν ἢ ὡς οὐ πέφυκας αὐτὸ φέρειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν συμβαίνει σοι ὡς πέφυκας φέρειν, μὴ δυσχέραινε, ἀλλ’ ὡς πέφυκας φέρε. εἰ δὲ ὡς μὴ πέφυκας φέρειν, μὴ δυσχέραινε· φθαρήσεται γάρ σε ἀπαναλῶσαν. μέμνησο μέντοι ὅτι πέφυκας φέρειν πᾶν, περὶ οὗ ἐπὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει ἐστὶ τῇ σῇ φορητὸν καὶ ἀνεκτὸν αὐτὸ ποιῆσαι κατὰ φαντασίαν τοῦ συμφέρειν ἢ καθήκειν σεαυτῷ τοῦτο ποιεῖν.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Related5
Commentary

A dilemma with no third term. The passage is built as an exhaustive disjunction of the same type as "providence or atoms" (9.39): everything that happens is either such as you are TERMby nature (πέφυκας) able to bear, or such as you are not. Both branches lead to the same place: μὴ δυσχέραινε, "do not be vexed." The first, because you can: bear it as you are constituted to bear. The second, because φθαρήσεται γάρ σε ἀπαναλῶσαν, "it will perish, having used you up": what exceeds your endurance will end together with you, and there is neither anyone nor any point in being vexed. The form of the argument is the school's "disarming dilemma."

And then the dilemma collapses. The second beat is μέμνησο μέντοι, "remember, however." The proviso cancels almost the whole second branch: you are by nature able to bear everything with respect to which DOGMAmaking it endurable and tolerable "lies with your own TERMopinion" (ἐπὶ τῇ ὑπολήψει ἐστὶ τῇ σῇ). The boundary of the bearable therefore runs not through the event but through the judgement. The second branch stays formally open — but is in fact nearly empty: almost everything that seems unbearable is unbearable by ὑπόληψις, not by nature (cf. 5.18; 4.7; 8.47).

By what the judgement makes it bearable. The mechanism is named exactly: κατὰ TERMφαντασίαν τοῦ συμφέρειν ἢ TERMκαθήκειν — "on the impression that this is advantageous, or that it is fitting." Two motives, and of different kinds: συμφέρον is the reckoning of benefit, καθῆκον the technical Stoic "appropriate," the act that suits one's nature and role. Marcus offers both without choosing: to make the unbearable bearable it is enough to see in it either a use or a duty. The governing discipline is desire (the acceptance of what happens), the sustaining one assent (the work upon ὑπόληψις).

Textual note. φθαρήσεται ("will be destroyed," from φθείρω) is printed here; part of the tradition gives φθήσεται (from φθάνω — "will be gone first"). The sense is the same either way and agrees with both translations: Long, "it will perish after it has consumed thee"; Rogovin, «уничтожив тебя, оно погибнет и само». Further, the stub carried a full stop after ὡς πέφυκας φέρειν, which broke the conditional period; the comma has been restored on the authority of the Greek source and of both translations.

DisciplineDiscipline of desire
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished