The impression follows the condition. Three examples: to the jaundiced honey is bitter, to the dog-bitten water is fearful (hydrophobia), to a child a ball is fine. In every case the "appearance" (φαίνεται) is dictated by the condition of the perceiver, not by the thing itself. The governing discipline is assent (the nature of the false judgment); the sustaining one is action (how to treat those who err).

Why then am I angry? (τί οὖν ὀργίζομαι). The conclusion is against anger: if bile and venom of necessity distort perception, then a false opinion (τὸ διεψευσμένον) acts no less powerfully — it too is a "disease" that compels the person. So a neighbour's bad act is a symptom of his distorted judgment, not a free challenge to me. To be angry at him is as absurd as to resent the jaundiced man for finding honey bitter. This is the Stoic ground of gentleness: "they err through ignorance" (cf. 06-27).

Parallels. Error as a "disease" of judgment; good-will toward wrongdoers — 06-27 (they sin through ignorance; they are akin to me); 02-01 (the morning exercise: misdeeds come from not knowing good and evil); Med. 7.22; 7.26; 8.14; 9.42; 11.18. Cf. 06-52 (things do not produce our judgments — the valuation is added by us).