MED. 6.27Discipline of action
George Long · 1862EN · Long

How cruel it is not to allow men to TERMstrive after the things which appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed because they TERMdo wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable to them.- But it is not so.- Teach them then, and show them without being angry.

Original · ancient Greek

Πῶς ὠμόν ἐστι μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα αὐτοῖς οἰκεῖα καὶ συμφέροντα. καίτοι τρόπον τινὰ οὐ συγχωρεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ὅταν ἀγανακτῇς, ὅτι ἁμαρτάνουσι· φέρονται γὰρ πάντως ὡς ἐπὶ οἰκεῖα καὶ συμφέροντα αὐτοῖς. —ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔχει οὕτως.— οὐκοῦν δίδασκε καὶ δείκνυε μὴ ἀγανακτῶν.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Commentary

Genre and place in the book. The therapy of anger toward an "offender" through the Socratic mechanism of error. The principal discipline is action (to teach, not to rage); the sustaining one is assent (to understand that a person is drawn toward an apparent good). Kin to 02-01, 06-06, 06-20, 06-26.

The impulse toward the apparent good (ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα). Every TERMimpulse (ὁρμή) is directed toward what appears (φαινόμενα) to a person "suitable" (οἰκεῖα) and "profitable" (συμφέροντα). To be angry that people are drawn toward their apparent good is to demand that they not do what every living being does. Hence the anger is "cruel" (ὠμόν) and self-contradictory: you would forbid them the very nature of impulse.

Error is involuntary (ἁμαρτάνουσι). They TERMerr (ἁμαρτάνουσι) not from malice but because the apparent good is false. To the objection "but it is not so [not really good]" (ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει οὕτως) there is one answer: then they are deceived — and one does not punish the deceived with anger. The Socratic thesis: no one errs willingly; error is a false impression of the good.

Teach, without anger (δίδασκεμὴ ἀγανακτῶν). The conclusion: "teach and show them (δίδασκε καὶ δείκνυε), without vexation." The right response to error is not rage but instruction — to show that the apparent good is not a good. Anger here is doubly out of place: it both demands the impossible and forgets that error is correctable by explanation (cf. 06-06, 06-20, 06-26 — without returning anger).

Disciplines and parallels. The principal one is action (to teach the erring); the secondary is assent (to see the mechanism: the impulse toward the apparent good). Parallels: 02-01 (they err through ignorance of good and evil; born for cooperation); Med. 7.22 (to love even those who do wrong); 8.14; 7.26 (ask what opinion of the good moves him — and you will pity, not rage); 06-06, 06-20 (without returning anger).

DisciplineDiscipline of action
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished
Discipline of action

George Long · 1862· EN · Long

How cruel it is not to allow men to TERMstrive after the things which appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profitable! And yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do this, when thou art vexed because they TERMdo wrong. For they are certainly moved towards things because they suppose them to be suitable to their nature and profitable to them.- But it is not so.- Teach them then, and show them without being angry.

Original · ancient Greek

Πῶς ὠμόν ἐστι μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα αὐτοῖς οἰκεῖα καὶ συμφέροντα. καίτοι τρόπον τινὰ οὐ συγχωρεῖς αὐτοῖς τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ὅταν ἀγανακτῇς, ὅτι ἁμαρτάνουσι· φέρονται γὰρ πάντως ὡς ἐπὶ οἰκεῖα καὶ συμφέροντα αὐτοῖς. —ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἔχει οὕτως.— οὐκοῦν δίδασκε καὶ δείκνυε μὴ ἀγανακτῶν.

Leopold · Teubner 1908
Related2
Commentary

Genre and place in the book. The therapy of anger toward an "offender" through the Socratic mechanism of error. The principal discipline is action (to teach, not to rage); the sustaining one is assent (to understand that a person is drawn toward an apparent good). Kin to 02-01, 06-06, 06-20, 06-26.

The impulse toward the apparent good (ὁρμᾶν ἐπὶ τὰ φαινόμενα). Every TERMimpulse (ὁρμή) is directed toward what appears (φαινόμενα) to a person "suitable" (οἰκεῖα) and "profitable" (συμφέροντα). To be angry that people are drawn toward their apparent good is to demand that they not do what every living being does. Hence the anger is "cruel" (ὠμόν) and self-contradictory: you would forbid them the very nature of impulse.

Error is involuntary (ἁμαρτάνουσι). They TERMerr (ἁμαρτάνουσι) not from malice but because the apparent good is false. To the objection "but it is not so [not really good]" (ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει οὕτως) there is one answer: then they are deceived — and one does not punish the deceived with anger. The Socratic thesis: no one errs willingly; error is a false impression of the good.

Teach, without anger (δίδασκεμὴ ἀγανακτῶν). The conclusion: "teach and show them (δίδασκε καὶ δείκνυε), without vexation." The right response to error is not rage but instruction — to show that the apparent good is not a good. Anger here is doubly out of place: it both demands the impossible and forgets that error is correctable by explanation (cf. 06-06, 06-20, 06-26 — without returning anger).

Disciplines and parallels. The principal one is action (to teach the erring); the secondary is assent (to see the mechanism: the impulse toward the apparent good). Parallels: 02-01 (they err through ignorance of good and evil; born for cooperation); Med. 7.22 (to love even those who do wrong); 8.14; 7.26 (ask what opinion of the good moves him — and you will pity, not rage); 06-06, 06-20 (without returning anger).

DisciplineDiscipline of action
Record added2026-07-16
Statuspublished